

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Department of Political Science

Working Paper Series „Glocal Governance and Democracy“

Joachim Blatter

Forms of Political Governance: Theoretical Foundations and Ideal Types



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
University of Lucerne

December 2012

ISSN 1662-923X

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With its working paper series “Glocal governance and democracy” the Institute of Political Science at the University of Lucerne provides the opportunity to present conceptual ideas, normative debates and empirical findings regarding current political transformations of the modern state system. The term “glocalization” addresses key transformations in respect to levels of governance and democracy – multiplication and hybridization. These features can also be observed in the processes of horizontal interpenetration and structural overlaps among territorial units (transnationalization), in new forms of steering with actors from the private, the public and the non-profit sector (governance), in the interferences among functional regimes and discourses and in emerging new communities and networks between metropolitan centres and peripheries on various scales. One of our core themes is migration and its consequences for development, transnational integration and democracy. A second field of research and discussion is governance and democracy in functionally differentiated and multi-level systems.

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Forms of Political Governance

Theoretical Foundations and Ideal Types

Abstract

The Working Paper provides the theoretical foundations for an analytically and normatively adequate understanding of “governance” – a term and concept that has been widely used since the turn of the millennium for describing new forms of political steering and integration. It starts with an overview of the governance discourse at the beginning of the 21st century. We can distinguish a normative and an analytical application of the term governance. In its normative usage, governance constitutes a programmatic alternative to other paradigms for organizing and reforming the state and public administration. The competing paradigms can be subsumed under the terms government and management. For analytical purposes, the term governance is used, by contrast, to diagnose a change in forms of political steering, and sometimes even in politics and statehood altogether and to aptly conceptualise this change.

After a critique of existing understandings and typologies, we develop the theoretical building blocks for a comprehensive and at the same time differentiated understanding of governance. First, we look at ‘worldviews’ (Weltbilder), basic assumptions on how the world is functioning or on how the world is supposed to function. Hence, worldviews can correspond to ontologies, basic assumptions on the type of entities that exist and on their relationships, but also to ideologies as comprehensive conceptualisations of an ideal world. We distinguish between holistic and elementaristic worldviews. Second, we turn to “images of social order” (Gesellschaftsbilder) as the fundamental assumptions on how societies are differentiated and on what holds societies together and describe two basic forms: segmentary differentiation and mechanical integration on the one hand and functional differentiation and organic integration on the other hand. “Models of human nature” (Menschenbilder) serve as the third differentiation criteria for the formation of a theory-based typology of governance. Each model of human nature comprises a concept of human behaviour/action and the corresponding understanding of institutionalised structures which influence human behaviour but which are shaped by human behaviour at the same time. The two most important models of human nature in modern social sciences are the *homo oeconomicus* and *homo sociologicus*. In order to develop a typology of forms of political governance, we will pick up the third dimension and transform the core insight from the micro- to the macro-level. In line with the *homo oeconomicus*, the term “government(s)” represents an understanding of political institutions as formalized instruments of the political community; in contrast, the term “governance” denotes a constitutional understanding of political institutions as a communicative structure which (re)creates the political community.

Based on these three dimensions, we develop an eightfold typology of forms of governance. Whereas “centralised government”, “concerted governments”, “competing governments” and “contracting governments” correspond to the instrumental understanding of institutions in line with the *homo oeconomicus*, the other four forms – “communitarian governance”, “civic governance”, “creative governance” and “cogent governance” – build on the constitutive conceptualisation of institutions that correspond to the *homo sociologicus*. For each of the eight ideal types, we scrutinise the core features so that the typology can be applied in empirical studies for tracing differences and transformations of ideas and realities in political governing across time and place.

Keywords: Governance theory, institutionalism, agency and structure, world views, images of social order, models of human nature

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Preface

This Working Paper is a thoroughly revised English version of the theoretical part of my German habilitation (post-doctoral thesis), which is titled "Governance – Theoretische Formen und historische Transformationen. Politische Steuerung und Integration in Metropolregionen der USA (1850 – 2000)." The habilitation was published in 2007 in the series "Modernes Regieren – Schriften zu einer neuen Regierungslehre" (Blatter 2007). The book has been awarded with the prize for the best post-doc book of that year from the German Political Science Association. Furthermore, it has been included in the "Deutsch-Plus"-program of the Volkswagen-Foundation. The VW-Foundation provides money for the translation of academic writings from German into English with the goal to make academic work that exhibits a German tradition of scholarly thinking accessible to a broader audience.

The process of translation revealed how much the German way of thinking goes along with a specific kind of writing and how big the challenge is to transform the German habilitation into an accessible and readable book in English. In order to make it possible or easier for an English reader to follow the abstract and dense reasoning of the book, it is often necessary not just to translate single words or sentences but to provide an entirely different structure in the line of argument. It became clear that a close collaboration between the author and translator would be necessary for the outcome of the translation process to be successful. Unfortunately, circumstances made it impossible for me to invest enough time and energy in this project when Dr. Michael Dobbins was working on the translation. Only much later after he had finished his first draft of the translation, I found time during my sabbatical at the Australian National University in Canberra in autumn of 2011 to return to this project.

It is not really surprising that I found it necessary to update the theoretical literature and the conceptual foundations of what I call "performative action" and "cognitive action" since these micro-foundations have been at the forefront of recent theoretical debates and scientific research. I hope that I have been successful in summing up recent insights in communication research and cultural studies in order to gain a better understanding of the theoretical foundations of those forms of governance which dominated the discourse at the turn of the millennium: "creative governance" and "cogent governance".

It will take another summer to finish the translation of the empirical part of the habilitation. Since there is still a long way to go and because I had many positive experiences when presenting the (revised) theoretical part to colleagues and students, I decided to publish the English version of the theoretical part as quickly as possible as a working paper.

I would like to thank the VW-Foundation for their generosity, Dr. Michael Dobbins for his intensive efforts to translate the theoretical part of the habilitation and Andrea Blättler for her help in finalizing and formatting this working paper.

Introduction and Overview

At the beginning of the new millennium, the term *governance* was one of the favourites in the race to claim the title of the most widely used term in the social sciences. In fact, on the Internet *governance* received clearly more hits than the term *globalisation*, which dominated the social science discourse during the 1990s (Brunnengräber et al. 2004: 1).¹ Overviews of the usage and origins of *governance* point out that the term was first introduced in a normative context. International organisations, in particular, have developed criteria for *good governance* after the importance of the political-administrative system for social development was rediscovered and corresponding quality criteria for good governance were needed (see e.g. Hill 2005). In the meantime, the analytical usage of the term *governance* has become increasingly widespread. However, it is no coincidence that it often remains unanswered whether the term is linked to a new, more comprehensive understanding of steering or whether the term *governance* indicates an actual change in real forms of steering (Benz 2004b).

The overviews of the topic published by Arthur Benz (2004a) and Gunnar Folke Schuppert (2005a) demonstrate that especially in Germany the term *governance* has become wide-spread not only in all sub-disciplines of political science but also in public administration and economics. *Governance* has become a major concept not only in urban, regional and federal studies but also in research on European integration and in international relations. It is also prominent in the most recent discussion on the reform of the state and public administration (Jann & Wegrich 2004; Klenk & Nullmeier 2004). In German political science the *governance* discourse is succeeding the classical debates on political steering (Mayntz 2004). It is also no coincidence that the linkages between different administrative levels, which have become more prevalent as a result of European integration, are increasingly being described and analysed on the basis of the concept of *multi-level-governance* (Benz 2004c). It is striking that the economic perspective on *governance* has not only impacted public discourse, but that the political science perspective has also been strongly influenced by the New Institutional Economics, whose most prominent advocate, Oliver E. Williamson, already introduced the term *governance* at the end of the 1970s (Williamson 1979). As will be shown in the first part of this book, the economic perspective must be supplemented with a sociological perspective in order to gain a truly comprehensive understanding of governance and of the current transformation processes. Luckily, this insight has already been taken up in a volume edited by Stefan Lange and Uwe Schimank (2004). The articles by Lange and Schimank (2004) as well as additional other articles published in the volume provide theoretical and empirical evidence which demonstrates that for a comprehensive understanding of *governance* it is necessary to complement the instrumental perspective on political steering with a constitutive perspective.

¹ A search of the term *governance* with the Internet search engine "Google" in January 2006 resulted in approximately 230 million hits, while the term *globalization* only resulted in 57 million hits. Van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004: 144) demonstrate the rapid increase in the use of the term in the social science literature. Hill and Lynn (2005: 173) refer to large related research programs in the USA.

In consequence, the term *governance* will be used in the following, on the one hand, as a generic fundamental concept, which comprises all institutionalised forms of political steering and integration of societies. On the other hand, it is used – in combination with specifying adjectives – as a term that signifies those specific forms of *governance*, which are based on sociological theories of behaviour and institutions. In contrast, the term *government* signifies those specific forms, which are based on economic theories of behaviour and institutions.

The diverse and widespread use of the term *governance* indicates that it has hit the “pulse of the time”. However, the inflationary use of the term also has the effect that the contours of the concept are becoming increasingly fuzzy. Therefore, like Folke Gunnar Schuppert (Schuppert 2005b) I am proposing to take advantage of the broad use of the term *governance* in order to build a bridge between fundamental theoretical approaches in the social sciences. But at the same time, I want to increase the analytical usefulness of the term by developing a relatively broad set of diverse ideal-type forms of *governance*. That means that the term *governance* indicates a broader view on structures and processes of political governing in comparison to previous perspectives, which focused on government, management or steering. With the help of a typology developed on such a broad conceptual basis we can examine in a second step the extent to which normative ideas and empirical realities of political steering and integration have changed over time or how much they differ at different places or in different discourses.

Political science and public administration appear to be particularly suitable for building those bridges across disciplinary boundaries. These disciplines have a particularly good chance of building a bridge between economics and sociology precisely because they have not developed clear-cut but also single-minded understandings of human nature, as is the case for the other two disciplines with the “*homo sociologicus*” and the “*homo oeconomicus*.”

Our attempt to build such a bridge between economics and sociology is different from previous attempts in political science and public administration. Developments in political science were previously characterised by the fact that research programs and schools emerged in almost all sub-disciplines which massively borrowed from the theories from one of the two fundamental social science disciplines (“political sociology” and “political economy” – however, more correct descriptions of these research approaches would be “sociological perspectives on politics” and “economic perspectives on politics”). The development in the applied discipline of public administration, by contrast, is marked by the fact that the frameworks of analysis are not based on clear behavioural theories as conceptual foundations. The weaker theoretical foundations enabled an encompassing perspective on political and administrative interactions and institutions but it came with the price of a weaker analytic precision (see e.g. Benz 1994). One important attempt to bridge economic and sociological approaches in the form of a synthesis is the “actor-centred institutionalism”, which was developed by Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf (Mayntz &

Scharpf 1995, Scharpf 1997). Nevertheless, the behavioural theory of the *homo oeconomicus* is at the heart of and clearly dominates this approach. What has been lacking so far is an attempt to combine the concepts of both disciplines for analysing political steering and integration in such a form that the conceptual clarity of disciplinary concepts is not compromised by synthetic integration and that the hegemony of one of the disciplinary perspectives is avoided at the same time. In order to avoid those pitfalls, the conceptual framework that combines various disciplinary and theoretical approaches fulfils this bridging function in the loosely coupled form of a typology.

The working paper starts with an overview of the *governance* discourse at the beginning of the 21st century. We can distinguish a normative and an analytical application of the term *governance*. In its normative usage, *governance* constitutes a programmatic alternative to other paradigms for organizing and reforming the state and public administration. The competing paradigms can be subsumed under the terms *government* and *management*. For analytical purposes, the term *governance* is used, by contrast, to diagnose a change in forms of political steering, and sometimes even in politics and statehood altogether and to aptly conceptualise this change. However, pronounced ambiguities and contradictions can be detected in the literature that uses the term *governance* in order to describe recent changes in public policy making and public administration. These ambiguities can be traced back to the fact that the concept of *governance* has not been applied in a sufficiently differentiated manner and does not sufficiently tap into basic theories and typologies from the social sciences. This paper tries to fill this gap. It is devoted to scrutinising the theoretical fundamentals on which a comprehensive and at the same time differentiated typology of forms of *governance* can be based. In the concluding chapter, such a typology will be presented including eight ideal-type forms of *governance*.

1 From government to governance? Governance between a reform alternative and an analytical 'bridging' concept

The concept of governance can be found in both normative-programmatic contexts as a reform approach as well as in analytical-descriptive contexts as a category for describing and interpreting current transformation processes in politics and the state. Both lines of argument will be lay out with reference to selected major contributions to the discourse.

1.1 Governance as a normative and disciplinary alternative to government and management

The term *governance* can be found in political and ideological discussions as a reform alternative in particular to the recently dominant *New Public Management*, which was inspired by economics. Both concepts are presented as better alternatives to the traditional way of political steering that is associated with the term *government*.

1.1.1 Governance as a political reform alternative to government and management

For Werner Jann, one of the most influential German academics in the field of Public Administration, the concept of *governance* offers a progressive reform alternative to the neo-liberal reform paradigm of the previous decades (Jann & Wegrich 2004; Jann 2002, 2005). The conceptual core of *governance* is the plea for "blurring the boundaries" between the public and the private sector in contrast to a "shifting of boundaries" between the public and private sector which represents the conceptual core of the *New Public Management* approach and occurred as a result of liberalisation, privatisation, and the unilateral penetration of the political sphere by economic principles and rationales.²

This perspective of blurring boundaries ties into the discovery of the "third sector" as a social production, steering and integration reserve conceptually located between the "state" and the "market" as a reaction to the crisis of the welfare state (see Schuppert 1995; Seibel 1994: 23-55). Later on the discourse focused on the term "civil society" (e.g. Bogumil, Holtkamp & Schwarz 2003), which offers diverse ideological points of reference. Conservatives link it to the subsidiarity principle, socialists regard it as an alternative to capitalism, while liberals view it as an alternative to the bureaucratic state and post-materialists see it as an alternative to anonymous mass organisations in the modern era (Seibel 2002: 99). However, these diverse possible interpretations also mean that political parties have difficulties in using the term to distinguish themselves and that it provokes resistance in some political camps. Leftists fear,

² Accordingly, such a normative concept of *governance* and similar concepts such as the "activating state" are primarily associated with social-democratic governments. Jann (2002: 299) illustrates the links to Tony Blair's "Third Way" and to Bill Clinton and points out that Gerhard Schröder (1995) seized on the concept of the "activating state" at an early point in time. In their joint proclamation, *governance* was a key term in representing their reform agenda (Schröder 2002).

for example, that this concept contributes to the dismantling of the (welfare) state.³ Therefore social-democratic and left-wing politicians and political consultants have preferred the term “activating state”, according to which the state no longer plays an all-embracing role, but indeed a central role. On the one hand, the state is supposed to give greater consideration to initiatives from the civil society in its activities, while on the other hand the state and municipalities are to fulfil initiating, catalyzing and coordinative functions when promoting social self-regulatory capacities (Heinze 2002).⁴

However, the concept of the “activating state” did not become a central reform concept in Germany despite the takeover of government by the Red-Green coalition under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder, who seized on this concept early as the Prime Minister of Lower Saxony (Schröder 1995). This possibly has to do with the fact that a state-centred connotation is still inherent to this concept. The state seems to play the active part and society and citizens the passive part. Neither the concept of “civil society” nor the concept of the “activating state” is suitable for a political program that aims to depict society and the state as equal partners, because one element is predominant in each term. The concept of *governance*, by contrast, comprises a partnership-like and dynamic relationship between the state and society. Its abstractness makes it hardly applicable to direct usage in party politics and election campaigns, though. Nevertheless, due to its increasing usage in the private sector (in particular in the context of the *corporate governance* discussion, see Schneider 2004: 184-187) and at the international level (Behrens 2004),⁵ one can at least address the elites with the term *governance*.

The resulting greater focus of progressive reform strategies on the concept of *governance* is particularly evident in the essays by Werner Jann, which represent a mixture of analysis and advocacy of the *governance* approach (Jann & Wegrich 2004; Jann 2002). Jann (2002: 285-291) first illustrates the administrative policy models predominant at different time periods in the Federal Republic of Germany. From this historical perspective the model of a “democratic constitutional state” (demokratischer Rechtsstaat) dominated from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, only to be replaced by the “active state”

³ For example, Jörg Bogumil and Lars Holtkamp (2001) must defend themselves against such a categorization of the concept of civic community (Bürgerkommune).

⁴ The concept of the activating state was first developed by Bernhard Blanke and his colleagues in Lower Saxony (Lamping, Schridde, Plaß & Blanke 2002) and is primarily promoted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The clear ties between the Social Democrats and this concept are made particularly evident on the homepage: www.aktivierender-staat.de. The revitalization of the idea of a cooperative is also clearly linked to this, see e.g. the initiative “Aktive Bürgerschaft e.V.”, which is primarily supported by the cooperative banks (www.aktive-buergerschaft.de). See also the article by Adalbert Evers and Claus Leggewie (1999) in the “Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte” (Monthly Union Booklets), in which they also describe the “activating state as the “encouraging state”.

⁵ The most important example of such a programmatic usage of the governance concept is the White Book of the European Commission on “European Governance” (2001), in which openness and transparency as well as the integration of the “European civil society” are stressed, in particular, as a necessity to sustain the legitimacy of the European Union (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch 2004: 88). At the global level such a governance program has already existed since 1995, when the Commission on Global Governance initiated by Willi Brandt under the auspices of the UN put forward its report “Our Global Neighbourhood”. The report calls for the value-based further development of interest-based state cooperation at the international level as well as the strengthening of supranational institutions, although the establishment of a world government is explicitly rejected (Behrens 2004: 110/111). Through organizations such as the OECD the international governance discourse has found its way back to reform debates at the national and sub-national level through the international comparison of good governance practices (van Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004: 145).

model. From the end of the 1970s to the middle of the 1990s the model of the "trimmed down" state (schlanker Staat) dominated and finally from this period on the model of the "activating state". In the subsequent detailed comparison of the latter two models (Jann & Wegrich 2004: 200-210; Jann 2002: 291-300) Jann no longer uses the terms "trimmed down" state and "activating state", rather *management* and *governance* as the main guiding concepts. According to him, the term *governance* embodies the paradigmatic alternative to the *New Public Management (NPM)* approach, which is primarily inspired by economic theory. Using such a dichotomous comparison it is possible to highlight the main differences with regard to the problem perceptions and fundamental values related to the concepts. While the concept of NPM assumes that the state has failed and thus laments the lacking efficiency of bureaucracy, the *governance* concept diagnoses a "failure of society" and points to developments leading to fragmentation and exclusion. Instead of optimizing the efficiency of public administration with the regulatory instruments of the private sector (competition, contracts), the incorporation of societal actors is now paramount to the solution of problems and the production of public goods. The decisive difference is that NPM sees for a clear separation of political goal-setting and administrative implementation as well as the exclusive linkage between politics and administration by means of contractual or contract-like agreements. An additional core building block of the NPM philosophy is the extensive privatisation of previously public services, i.e. the shifting of the boundaries between the public and private sector to the benefit of the latter. In contrast, the advocates of the *governance* approach criticise the separation of politics and administration as unrealistic and dysfunctional. They lament the technocratic understanding of public goods, which is predominant in NPM (Bogumil & Jann 2005: 256; Jann 2002: 298). From a *governance* perspective, not the separation, rather the close and multi-faceted connections between politics, administration and society are necessary to facilitate the efficient and legitimate provision of public goods. The cooperation between state, private, and non-profit organisations as "co-producers" serve to mobilise diverse knowledge and extensive resources, while the multi-faceted forms of participation increase the legitimacy of public action. Therefore a "new division of responsibilities between the state and society", the "coordination of public and societal actors", and the "combination of different forms of steering" as well as "network management" are called for (Jann & Wegrich 2004: 200).

Even the advocates of the normative concept of *governance* admit that it lacks clarity in various ways (Jann & Wegrich 2004: 194). While the *management* paradigm contains clear understandings of roles and lines of delegation and responsibility – public administrators as agents of politicians and politicians in turn as agents of the people/the society – these roles are less evident according to the concept of *governance*. Here the state appears again as the central actor – without a clear differentiation between politics and administration –, even if it no longer acts from a superordinate position vis-à-vis societal actors. Yet the latter point is often left unclear, as the promotion of a "combination of various forms of

steering" (Bogumil & Jann 2005: 256) includes the possibility that the state also applies a hierarchical-regulatory form of steering vis-à-vis society. That means that both the roles and positions that the various actors take in relation to each other as well as the forms of interaction between the actors are not conclusively defined by the *governance* concept. The advocates of the *governance* paradigm also do not specify whether *governance* constitutes an alternative to NPM or whether it is to be understood as supplementing NPM (Jann & Wegrich 2004).⁶ For a normative-programmatic usage, this ambiguity is indeed helpful, because it grants its advocates the necessary flexibility to either stress the differences to the *government* and *management* concepts or ways to tie into these approaches depending on the context. The first strategy is necessary for creating a distinct profile and for mobilisation and the second for the formation of reform coalitions.

1.1.2 Governance – the re-emergence of the sociological perspective

As regards the scientific disciplines, the decisive change that the *governance* concept brings about is that it turns away from an instrumental conceptualisation of the relationship between the state and society, as is predominantly the case with the law-based governmental perspective and the management perspective that draws its inspirations from economics. From these perspectives the state is the instrument for the realisation of the people's or citizens' will, which is determined by means of public deliberation and/or through formal aggregation and coordination procedures (votes/prices). This instrumental view of the state brings the control problem to the fore in both concepts. While jurists guarantee the control over state activities by means of law and the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy, economists conceptualize the situation as a principal-agent model between citizens as consumers and bureaucrats as service providers. According to both perspectives the formation of individual or collective preferences and societal integration are not treated as a problem. This is clearly different from a *governance* perspective. Jann (2002: 294) as well as Jann and Wegrich (2004: 200) speak of the failure of society as the problem diagnosis of the *governance* perspective (unlike the failure of the market and state according to both other concepts). First, they argue that the pluralisation of society has advanced so far that the possibilities for and legitimacy of uniform goal-setting has become the core problem for policy-making – and not the implementation of political goals by the state. According to this view, the market can solve the problem of coordinating multiple preferences, but only at the expense of social disintegration and deprivation. Second, the state has reached the limits of resources that society is willing to relinquish so that the state can pursue collective goals. However, with fewer and fewer resources, society is also no longer able to transfer the responsibility for the solution of societal problems to the

⁶ This ambiguity is widespread and has to do, among other things, with the fact that the concept of *governance* has had very different and even opposite connotations in the international and English-language usage of the term. As Bevir shows, the normative usage of the concept as *good governance* at the World Bank in 1992 is closely linked with concepts of NPM. In contrast, the consultants and political scientists who introduced the *governance* concept into the Labour government program viewed *governance* as a corrective response to NPM and the privatization activities of the previous conservative governance (Bevir 2003).

state. The state and society must now take on and cope with this responsibility together in a cooperative manner. The ensuing advocacy of networks and trustful cooperation, but also the necessary mobilisation of intrinsically motivated participation and co-production by citizens (see the articles in Heinze & Olk 2001) are elements, which can be more easily reconciled with sociological than an economic theory of action and institutions (see more in chapter 5).

Thus, it is evident that from a *governance* perspective the understanding of the relationship between society and state has transformed from an instrumental to an integrative-constitutive relationship. The state is no longer an instrument for the realisation of societal goals; rather the state and society interact as co-producers, in order to give society self-reassurance and identity, to mobilise self-regulatory potentials and to guarantee societal integration. To put it bluntly, the *governance* concept goes hand in hand with a renaissance of sociology as a leading discipline for political science and public administration. The discourse is no longer focusing on issues of steering and control between state and society, rather is increasingly addressing the "integration problem" of society, which has been a central issue in sociology since it became a distinct social science discipline (Lange & Schimank 2004: 10, Heitmeyer & Imbusch 2005).

1.2 Governance as a transdisciplinary bridging concept for the positive analysis and interpretation of historical transformations of political steering and integration

Besides the outlined usage of the *governance* concept as a normative reform model, it has also been introduced as an analytical concept to describe and understand the current transition of governing and "statehood" (Grande & Prätorius 2003). The broad usage of the term *governance* in practically all social science disciplines as well as the broader way of looking at political structures and processes that comes with it (in comparison to earlier discussions on political steering and organisation) gives us the opportunity to use the concept of *governance* as a transdisciplinary bridging concept. As demonstrated in the following, there are several approaches for doing so, which are plagued with problems though.

1.2.1 Governance as a generic term or new phenomenon?

It is not a coincidence that many articles on the topic of governance begin with statements that refer to the diverse usages and meanings related to this concept (e.g. Benz 2004a: 12; Pierre & Peters 2000: 14; Hill 2004, 2005). The governance discourse appears particularly confusing because the term is used at two levels of abstraction – on the one hand as a generic fundamental concept which includes all institutional forms of social coordination (as in institutional economics for example) and on the other hand as a new specific form of governing, which is contrasted with other "older" forms - mostly in a dichotomous way. The latter point of view and usage dominates in political science and public

administration and is related to the fact that a – mostly implicit – overlap with normative objectives can be ascertained.⁷ While referring to prominent political science work, the following segment shows that the usage of the governance concept as a specific form of steering contains numerous ambiguities. Therefore, it seems more adequate to use it as an umbrella term for all forms of political steering (and integration) – and that is indeed what we discover in more recent contributions.

Governance as a specific and new form of steering?

The understanding of *governance* as a new form of political steering and integration can be found in the most diverse areas of political science, e.g. in the hypothesis concerning the transition from *government* to *governance* (in public policy: Rhodes 1997, in international relations: Rosenau & Czempiel 1992, in local politics: John 2001).⁸ The book by R.A.W. Rhodes (1997) "Understanding Governance" is a particularly important reference for theoretical discussions on the changes in statehood. It represents, on the one hand, the transition of the theoretical discussion from the focus on networks in the early 1990s to the subsequent *governance* perspective. In the *governance* literature, on the other hand, it embodies the now mostly vanquished hypothesis of *governance* as "governing without government" (Rhodes 1997: 46-61). Also in international relations the *governance* discourse gained momentum with the provocative formulation of the emerging international order as "governance without government" (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992). While Rhodes refers to the significance of relatively autonomous *policy communities* and *issue networks* in the political process as opposed to the English Westminster model (parliamentary sovereignty), the title of Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) aims to stress the diversity of regulatory approaches at the international level, without interpreting them as steps towards a world government. Both blunt phrases were strongly criticised in the following period and it was shown that national governments still play the main role in the political process both in international relations as well as domestic politics (for the European Union see Moravcsik 1994; for subnational politics in England see Davies 2002).

In both areas the meaning attached to the concept of *governance* has changed accordingly. Instead of building on the contrast between state steering and societal self-regulation, the main focus is placed on the cooperation between state and societal actors. Nevertheless, the *governance* literature still remains unclear with regard to the involved actors, as sometimes purely intergovernmental networks and sometimes purely self-regulatory networks within the civil society are often subsumed under the concept of *governance* (see e.g. Mayntz 2004: 68-70). In the *governance* literature such shifts and ambiguities are

⁷ In contrast to the normative-programmatic *governance* literature, there are indeed critical reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of "informal", "cooperative" and "network-like" forms of *governance* in analytical studies (see e.g. Rhodes 2000: 80-83; Mayntz 1996; Benz 1994; Messner 1994).

⁸ Such dichotomous descriptions of the transformation of political systems tie into similar dichotomous hypotheses on change from the 1990s and attempt to bundle them: these hypotheses declared the change from the sovereign to the cooperative state (Benz 1994), from the formal to informal state action (Fürst 1994) and from hierarchy to networks (Scharpf 1993; Ladeur 1993; Kenis & Schneider 1991).

evident not only with regard to the involved actors, but also with regard to the criterion “form of interaction”. At the beginning of the discussion the changes in political steering with regard to the mode of interaction and the regulatory instrument were characterised by the transformation of hierarchical directives in a vertical system of relations towards partnership-like agreements based on horizontal relationships (e.g. Kenis & Schneider 1991: 36, with reference to Hanf & Scharpf 1978). More recently, a greater emphasis has been placed on the multitude and the combination of modes of interaction and steering mechanisms (Benz 2004a: 5). This changed diagnosis with regard to what is the central aspect of the current transformation goes hand in hand with the spread of a broad range of conceptually perceived mechanisms, modes and rules of interaction. Instead of dichotomies or three-fold typologies (organisation, market plus community or network) we now find a plurality of coordination and steering mechanisms as features of *governance*. For example, Benz (2004a: 5) lists the following mechanisms: competition, exchange, unilateral exertion of power, negotiations, trust, unilateral or mutual adjustment. Such mechanisms have neither a foundation in behavioural theory, nor are they so clearly defined that they could be used as distinguishable ideal-types for empirical analyses. The most problematic aspect appears to be that the German *governance* discourse in political science with regard to the motives and forms of interaction is again vulnerable to falling victim to a similar functionalistic-rationalistic narrowing of the perspective, as was the case at the beginning of the network discourse, when the reason for network formation was almost exclusively traced back to functional interdependencies and/or resource interdependencies (see e.g. Kenis & Schneider 1991) and the form of interaction was technocratically abbreviated an “exchange of information” (as in quantitative network analysis, see e.g. Pappi & König 1995) or conceptualised as negotiations between rational corporative actors (as in the work of Max Planck Institute in Cologne, see e.g. Mayntz 1996). The insights of policy analysis on the significance of ideational and normative-cognitive factors as bases for stable interactions and networks needs to be incorporated into a *governance* theory, which aims to cover the whole range of *governance* mechanisms (as occurs in more recent textbooks on policy research, see e.g. Schneider & Janning 2005).

Governance as a comprehensive theory of political steering or as a common trend across fields and disciplines?

In his book “governing as governance”, Jan Kooiman (2003) develops a comprehensive theory of governing and thereby presents *governance* as a conceptual approach that can cover fundamentally all existing forms of steering and integration. In terms of Kooiman’s own development the book represents the broadening of perspective from contrasting cooperative interactions between the state and society with hierarchical steering by government, as he had done ten years earlier in his book “Modern Governance: Government-Society Interactions”, to a *governance* perspective whose essence is that “governance of and in modern societies is a mix of all kinds of governing efforts by all manners of social-political actors, public as well as private; occurring between them at different levels, in different

governance modes and orders" (Kooiman 2003: 3). He also offers hypotheses on the current transformation of statehood (from command to regulation, from procuring to enabling, from benevolence to activation), but emphasizes the remaining centrality of the state and sees the changes primarily in the forms of governing (Kooiman 2003: 118-123). Kooiman's book is very innovative in various ways. Firstly, it embeds the description of the contemporary change in a comprehensive systemic approach to political and social regulation/steering. Moreover, it promises theoretical progress in *governance* research – firstly through a micro-based approach, secondly through its analysis of *images* as a central element of *governance* and thirdly through the systematic development of ideal types at different levels (elements, modes and orders of *governance*). However, these promises are not always met, because his deliberate combination of an analytical and a synthetic approach (Kooiman 2003: 5, 9) leads to significant conceptual ambiguities. As a result, his approach is not suited for measuring variations in forms of *governance* over time and space. The main problem is that his three types of interactions, which constitute the conceptual basis for his systemic framework, are very unclearly defined and are not based on established behavioural theories.⁹

While the book by Kooiman is an attempt to develop a comprehensive understanding of governance on the basis of an integrated system-theoretic approach, an essay by van Kersbergen und van Waarden (2004) demonstrates the other extreme within the attempts to use the governance term as a basis for a trans-disciplinary analytic concept. In their overview of the governance literature in various disciplines van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004: 144-151) outline nine approaches: good governance; governing without government I: international relations; governing without governance II: self-organisation; economic governance; corporate governance; new public management; governance in and by networks in general; multilevel governance and private network governance. They provide definitions and descriptions of governance under these headings without attempting to analyse the different understandings of governance more precisely or to make them comparable by means of applying uniform overarching criteria. Accordingly, the inductively gained insights from this comparison remain vague. Van Kersbergen and van Waarden identify the following common features with regard to the meaning of governances in these fields:

"First of all, the approach is pluricentric rather than unicentric. Second, networks, whether inter- or intraorganizational, play an important role. These networks organize relations between relatively autonomous, but interdependent, actors. [...] In these networks, hierarchy or monocratic leadership is less important, if not absent. The formal *Government* may be involved, but not necessarily so, and if it is, it is merely one – albeit an important – actor among many others. Third, one finds an emphasis on processes of governing or functions as against the structures of *Government*. These processes are relatively similar in the public and private sectors, and

⁹ He distinguishes between interferences, which are defined as "interactions forming the 'primary' societal processes", interplays, which are described as "interactions with a typical 'horizontal' character", and interventions, which are characterised as "the most formalised kind of societal interactions" (Kooiman 2003: 21/22).

concern negotiation, accommodation, concertation, cooperation and alliance formation rather than the traditional processes of coercion, command and control. Fourth, [...] different sectors have developed different institutions to reduce risks and uncertainties in order to make cooperation possible or easier. Finally, many approaches are normative" (Van Kersbergen und van Waarden 2004: 151/152).

This summary shows that the attempt to trace the meaning of the term *governance* in various fields and areas in order to develop a better understanding of the concept by identifying the commonalities is not very instructive and sometimes even misleading.¹⁰ Characteristically, the authors no longer systematically draw on this "cross-section definition" of *governance* when outlining the changes found in the described areas. They describe this transition as a transition in the "location" and the "style" of *governance*. Only one aspect in the identified change in style (from *command/control* to *negotiation/concertation*) ties into an element of the "cross-section definition" (van Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004: 153-155).

In conclusion, this also does not seem to be a successful approach to using the concept of *governance* as a bridge between (sub-)disciplines. Neither the integration of steering and integration mechanisms into a systemic approach nor the inductive search for a common denominator of the various *governance* discourses leads to a concept of *governance*, which can serve as a sufficiently clear interpretive framework for the analysis of change over time or for comparing the variation of political and societal forms of steering and integration over place.

Altogether, it is evident that both the attempts to define *governance* as a specific form of political steering and integration as well as the attempts to establish *governance* as a generic concept for encompassing theories of steering/governing demonstrate so many ambiguities that they are unsatisfactory from an analytical point of view. These ambiguities can be reduced by a stronger differentiation of *governance* ideal-types. However, it appears neither possible nor expedient to circumvent a source of the terminological ambiguity by comprehending the concept of *governance* either as a generic umbrella term or as a specific type of forms of steering and integration. Just as the concept of *network* in political science literature is used both as a fundamental (theoretical and methodological) approach to the analysis of different interaction structures in policy areas as well as a specific form of political steering (Pappi 1993), the dual usage of the concept of *governance* appears in a similar way inevitable, because it can simultaneously satisfy the needs for a new scientific perspective and for the description of a new reality. In order to fulfil these needs and still create terminological clarity, the term *governance* will be used in this book as a generic concept for all forms of political steering and integration. However, the concept of *governance* is additionally used in combination with specifying

¹⁰ Misleading is the wide-spread view in the literature that governance is characterised by an emphasis on processes instead of structures (see also e.g. Pierre & Peters 2000: 22). Such a diagnosis is based on a narrow understanding of structures, basically reducing them to formal institutions and regulations.

adjectives when defining a certain group of specific forms of political steering and integration (see chapter 6).

The illustrated ambiguities in the analytical usage of the concept of *governance* are not only due to the usage at two levels, but can be traced to two additional causes. This is, first, the fundamental assumption of the increasing societal and political “blurring of boundaries”, which is identified as a cause for the changes in forms of steering and integration and, second, the recourse to dichotomies or to simple and fuzzy ideal-types for the description of these changes. In the next two sections I will address these two aspects and discuss the theoretical points of reference in order to overcome the related weaknesses in *governance* research.

1.2.2 The transformation of forms of governance in the context of social transformations
Schimank and Lange (2001: 222) emphasize with reference to Haldenweg (1999) that “political orders together with their regulatory styles are conceptualized with a specific idea of the society in mind” [translation JB] and not vice-versa. In the political science discourse on *governance* up to now, we usually find very general descriptions of the change in society in which the transformation of the forms of political steering and integration is embedded. Kooiman (2003: 3) sees “ever growing societal diversity, dynamics and complexity” as the motive for the differentiation of forms of *governance*. Benz sums this up as follows: “We are observing the increasing transcendence of boundaries (*Grenzüberschreitungen*) in the political process, namely with regard to territorial as well as functional and sectoral boundaries” (Benz 2004: 14 [translation JB], for a similar view see Bang 2003: 2). Such a synopsis, which one might refer to as a general “de-differentiation hypothesis”, risks concealing instead of highlighting the main alternatives – “shifting boundaries” versus “blurring boundaries” – which are of crucial significance in the normative-programmatic dispute (compare section 1.1.1). In the analytical context the question arises with regard to the empirical extent of the diagnosed territorial, sectoral and functional transcendences of boundaries and whether one can truly speak of general transcendences of boundaries or whether the transcendence or blurring of one kind of boundaries does not indeed strengthen other boundaries. In the next paragraphs I provide some empirical evidence, which leads to the conclusion that it is very helpful for a “society-conscious” theory of *governance* to take into account the long line of thinking in sociology that deals with social differentiation and integration.

At the turn of the millennium there were clear indicators for increasing socio-economic interdependencies across territorial boundaries both at the supranational level (Europeanization, globalization) as well as the supra-municipal level (suburbanization) (for globalization see e.g. Perraton et al. 1998, for suburbanization e.g. Brake, Dangschat & Herfert 2001). Nevertheless, authors from the field of International Relations point to the fact that economic transactions across nation-state borders were – in relative terms – similarly strong at the beginning of the 20th century as at the start of the new

millennium (Hirst & Thompson 1998) and that one must question the linearity of the development implied in many hypotheses. In order to arrive at a better description and a true understanding of the current transformations, *governance* research also must take a look far back into the past, as is the case in International Relations with the discussion on the changes in the "Westphalian system" (see e.g. Caporaso 1996; Ruggie 1993). Also with regard to suburbanization there are doubts whether this leads to ever more interdependencies across municipal boundaries. In the USA suburbanization is so far advanced now that many "suburbs" have become quite independent from the central city. In consequence, one can argue that the socio-economic interdependencies between the main city and surrounding communities are decreasing instead of increasing (see e.g. Teaford 1997; Garreau 1991).

A differentiated view is also necessary with regard to the transcendences in boundaries between the state and private sector. The *governance* literature primarily stands in the tradition of the political science research on interest intermediation with its classic forms of pluralism and corporatism. This research tradition already shed doubt on the schoolbook notion that individual interests and ideologies are bundled by parties, transformed into parliamentary majorities by means of general elections and then implemented by the government and public administration. This schoolbook understanding, which is paradoxically being revived in *New Public Management*, thus had a clear idea of where the state and society should be linked – in parliament. Both pluralism as well as corporatism focussed, by contrast, on other societal actors (interest groups and associations) and other less formalized and, in the case of pluralism, more diverse types of linkages between state and society. In comparison to classic perspectives on interest intermediation, the *governance* approach is no longer concerned so much with the influence of social groups and associations on the state, rather with how the state influences society by means of intermediary groups and organisations as well (which has always been a central characteristics of corporatism, though). Yet not only are both directions of influence equally taken into consideration and regarded as legitimate: the policy network is also an approach which constitutes a hybrid between pluralism and corporatism with regard to the number of actors and the structural pattern of interaction. The picture is further complicated by the fact that not only a large number of societal actors (beyond the classical representatives of labour and capital interests) and more interfaces between the state and society are taken into account. At the same time more and more actors and arenas between and beyond the dichotomies of state (hierarchy) and society (market) are recognised as important. The third sector between the institutional poles state and market (and community) is populated by an array of highly diverse collective actors, while public-private partnerships facilitate the creation of trans-sectoral arrangements and actors. Altogether this means that the transcendence of boundaries between the public and private sector is characterised by the following aspects and features: the multiplication of the points of contact and streams of influence between the sectors and the development of trans-sectoral

actors, who either are of a hybrid nature (e.g. German chambers of commerce) or emerge by way of the formal link between state and private actors (e.g. Public-Private Partnerships).

Thus the hypothesis concerning the increasing transcendence of boundaries needs qualifications in respect to linearity and long-term development in its territorial dimension. Furthermore, the assumption that boundaries between the public and the private sector are overcome needs a more differentiated view. In respect to the functional dimension one might challenge the hypothesis altogether. If one reads the notion of an increasing transcendence of functional boundaries as a hypothesis of a process of de-differentiation of functional sub-systems, this claim would challenge one of the central theories of development in the social sciences. Since the early days of sociology, societal modernisation has been understood as the substitution of communities differentiated by segment with a functionally differentiated society (Schimank 1996). Beyond this sociological theory of development, we also find the thesis of functional differentiation as a normative concept in institutional economics as well (Frey & Eichenberger 1996) and in the regime theory approach as a description of the *governance* structures and *governance* mechanisms at the international level (e.g. Gehring 1990). From these perspectives, the current transformation of the political system would be characterised by a "second surge towards modernization", during which the principle of functional differentiation only asserts itself at the continental and global level and eliminates the final traces of a territorial segmentation in the form of nation states (Luhmann 1998: 145-171). This assumption of an increasing functional differentiation is opposed by normative concepts (such as "sustainable development") and finds challenges through empirical observations such as the relatively extensive integration in the form of the European Union and the still great importance of nation states. Thus, substantial uncertainty exists with regard to the functional differentiation or integration/de-differentiation, and one of the main tasks of positive *governance* research is to get a more precise picture in respect to this fundamental question by developing meaningful typologies and using these typologies for empirical analysis. In order to achieve this, it would be worthwhile to link *governance* theory with the sociological tradition of theories of social differentiation and integration, as Lange and Schimank (2004) have already done to some extent.

1.2.3 Existing typologies of forms of governance in economics, political science and sociology

If we aim at a description of the current transformation of political governing that is not only empirically precise but also tied into fundamental theoretical debates, we must reduce the fuzziness and ambiguity of the *governance* concept which emerges, in particular, when it is dichotomously juxtaposed with the concept of *government*. For both goals, it makes sense to draw on the differentiated typologies, which were developed within the neo-institutionalist paradigm in economics and political science. These typologies will be briefly outlined in the following and I will argue that the sociological typology, which

Schimank has recently developed, is an important extension. However, in order to function as a bridge beyond disciplinary boundaries, these disciplinary typologies must be linked.

Governance typologies in institutional economics and political science

Oliver E. Williamson (1996, 1991) has outlined one of the earliest and most powerful typologies in institutional economics. He first defined the two institutional ideal-types 'market' and 'hierarchy' as discrete structural alternatives, because they demonstrate a specific combination of features that mutually support each other, while other potential combinations of these features are unstable. 'Hierarchies' are marked by a specific combination of instruments (strong administrative control and weak incentive structures for egoistic behaviour) and by the fact that, instead of a specific and detailed contract with external means of control by the courts, a general superior/subordinate relationship exists, in which the superior may give commands. 'Markets' as an institutional ideal-type are characterised by the contrary forms of these aspects. These two ideal types distinguish themselves by their different degree of performance with regard to the frequency and consequence of interactions. In the case of low interaction frequency and relatively minor consequences of each interaction, problems of motivation, information and control can be better solved by markets, while hierarchies are more efficient in the case of high frequency of interactions and strong consequences. Hybrid, network-like *governance* structures are conceptualised as a mixed-type in Williamson's one-dimensional typology (Williamson 1991: 278-281).

The typologies developed by Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf within the framework of their "actor-centred institutionalism" have been particularly influential in German political science. In her systematisation of forms of *governance* Mayntz (1993: 44) makes a distinction based on "structural coupling". According to her, markets are characterised by the non-existence of structural coupling, hierarchies by tight coupling, and networks by loose coupling. Later Scharpf and Mayntz (1995: 60) recognised that the conventional typology of forms of *governance* (distinguishing between market, hierarchy and network) suffers analytically from its multi-dimensionality, since structural patterns of interaction and coordination mechanisms are usually not clearly distinguished. However, since they assume that structures and forms of interaction cannot be logically conceptualised independently of one another, they reduce institutional structures to the related coordination mechanisms in the aftermath. In their joint article they differentiate four "basic forms of coordinating social action": unilateral or mutual adjustment, negotiation, voting and hierarchical decision-making. They organize these basic forms on a one-dimensional scale according to the extent of individual freedom of action and, viewed the other way, according to the capacity for collective action (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995: 61). Scharpf (1997: 47) then further developed this concept by linking these mechanisms or modes of interaction with institutional structures in a remarkable manner. On the one hand, he distinguishes – and implicitly ranks – four institutional settings: *anarchic field*, *network*, *association* and *organization*. As for the modes of

interaction he distinguishes between *unilateral action*, *negotiated agreement*, *majority vote* and *hierarchical direction*. Each institutional setting is characterised by a specific “marginal mode of interaction.” This means that in each institutional setting not just one mode of interaction is possible. In “higher” institutional settings all modes of interaction, which are possible in “lower” institutional settings, are still possible – but on top of those a further mode of interaction is possible in a “higher” institutional setting. For example, majority decisions are the “marginal mode of interaction” for associations, which means that unilateral action and negotiations are also possible within such an institutional setting but hierarchical directives are not. They are only possible in hierarchies. Moreover, since Scharpf (ibid.) implies that the different modes of interaction develop stronger coordination capacities when they can be applied in combination, his typology implies a clear ranking among the four institutional settings in respect to their capacity for social coordination.

Such a reductionist conceptualisation where institutions are defined by their capacity for allowing modes of interaction provides a theoretically innovative and analytically clear concept for the analysis of forms of *governance*. However, this analytical concept is too narrow to grasp the current changes in the area of political steering, coordination and integration, as the rationalist conceptualisation of modes of interaction as forms of decision-making neglects the constitutive, identity-forming and mobilizing dimension of political institutions. As already indicated (and as demonstrated in the empirical section of the habilitation, Blatter 2007), precisely these aspects are gaining importance in recent proposals for new forms of *governance*.

A supplemental governance typology from sociology

A typological approach from sociology points in the direction in which Scharpf's conceptual design should be expanded, in order to grasp the society-oriented perspective of *governance* research. Schimank (2000: 207-322) classifies *governance* mechanisms according to which mode of mutual coordination of actions they are based on. The modes “observation”, “influence” and “negotiation” are distinguished and the “three modes are stratified according to a kind of Guttman scale: observation is a prerequisite for influence, but not vice-versa, and influence and observation are prerequisites for negotiation” (Lange & Schimank 2004: 20; translation JB). What is special and innovative about Schimank's conceptual design is not only that it is “actor-centred” just like Scharpf's approach and thus has a micro-foundation, but also that this micro-foundation is based not just on one theory of action/behaviour, but takes four basic concepts of human behaviour into account (norm-oriented, strategic, emotional and identity-based action/behaviour). Schimank (2000: 170-330) sees the development of consolidated structures (in the sense of institutions) as a result of different actor constellations and corresponding structural dynamics. Let's have a brief look at these constellations and dynamics.

The most elementary constellation of actors is the situation of mutual observation. It emerges as soon as at least two actors notice each other and let their actions be influenced by the perception of the respective other. Such constellations of mutual observation lead to unilateral or mutual adjustments (which by no means must be equated with cooperation and/or positive integration) that can be solidified into 'orientational patterns' if the constellation continues. At this elementary level of social interaction the aspects of generating attention and collective mobilisation take centre stage.

Building on 'mutual observation' as the elementary mode of social coordination, 'mutual influence' is conceptualised as a second mode. Here the actors target their counterparts with power, money, morality, and other potential means of influence and attempt to influence them according to their interests. For Lange and Schimank (2004: 21), communities are the result of a solidified influence constellation. They distinguish between different communities, depending on whether they are driven by affective or cognitive bonds. Schimank defines the third mode of social coordination as 'mutual negotiation'. This terminology already indicates that his conceptual design remains rather fuzzy at this point. While Schimank (2000: 303) also subsumes the sale of goods on spot markets under this category, Lange and Schimank (2004: 22) only cite networks, associations/polyarchies and hierarchies as structural patterns characterised by negotiations. According to Schimank the decisive feature of this type of coordination is the bonding force of the formal and informal agreements reached through negotiations. A positive aspect of Schimank's concept is that he considers not only a rationalistic-utilitarian behavioural theory with regard to the negotiations and the bonding impact of the agreements. However, the ideal type of the reciprocal negotiations clearly suffers from not being sufficiently differentiated. As Williamson (1991) - among others - has shown, it is not very expedient to treat agreements in markets, in networks, and in hierarchies as conceptually equivalent.

When comparing the typologies of Scharpf (1997) and Schimank (2000), it is striking that in both concepts the structural ideal types are defined and differentiated by the stepwise addition of individual modes of interaction and modes of reciprocal coordination of action. A certain normative preference is evident in Scharpf's analysis. Organisations are implicitly defined as the 'culmination' of institutionalization processes in Scharpf's classification, because organisations/hierarchies have the greatest steering potential due to the fact that all modes of interaction are available in this institutional setting, while other institutions (e.g. networks) are not as well equipped. Schimank's classification exhibits a less clear normative preference, because on the one hand it defines mutual observation as the most elementary coordination mechanism. On the other hand, he makes it clear that negotiations "perhaps [have created] the most momentous social invention for modern society and its development: corporative actors in the form of interest and labour organisations. As described by Luhmann, a middle level of social contexts for action has thus imposed itself between interaction, on the one hand, and society on the other hand" (Schimank 2000: 320).

The significance of the meso-level for the political steering and integration of societies

The relevance of a 'meso-level' between the overall societal system and individual action is indeed something that must be taken into consideration in every theoretical framework in social science and thus in the conceptualisation of forms of *governance* as well. Yet the question emerges nowadays whether this meso-level really primarily consists of corporative actors, as stipulated in the notion of an 'organizational society' as a central characteristic of modernity (see Janning 1998; Perrow 1989; Laumann & Knoke 1987; Presthus 1962), or whether less tightly coupled collective actors and more informal institutions have re-emerged as mediating structures between the macro- and micro-level. Lange and Schimank (2004: 13) point out themselves that individual behaviour is less and less determined by organisations nowadays, with mass media and less formalized institutions playing a growing role instead. This is one of the few diagnoses in respect to the current social transformations that can be found in Schimank's analysis. It is not entirely clear to what extent he wishes to contradict the thesis of Renate Mayntz (1993: 44), according to which the network is a synthesis of hierarchies and markets and has emerged in the course of a dialectical process, in which unstructured quasi-groups were first replaced by formal organisations (hierarchies), which were in turn replaced by networks. However, Mayntz' developmental thesis is not formulated without some degree of ambiguity. Sometimes it sounds as if she assumes that the subsequent form is replacing the previous form. When she writes about the final transformation towards networks, though, she speaks of a "complex system, which consists of many corporative actors" (ibid.). Corporate actors no longer form a single, integrated hierarchy, but networks are conceived as interorganisational networks, which hence build on hierarchies as integral parts of networks (this corresponds with the dominant perspectives in network research, see Kenis & Schneider 1996).

With regard to the assumed modes of interaction and structural patterns of interaction and in line with the German tradition of the "Steuerungstheorie" (theory of steering) (see Mayntz 2004), German *governance* literature to this day has been strongly influenced by corporatism research, which described negotiations between top representatives of highly integrated organisations (the state and interest associations) as corporatist arrangements (von Alemann & Heinze 1981; Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979). The *governance* literature is thus relatively blind towards alternative concepts of the intermediate sphere between society and individuals, which have established themselves in policy analysis, for example. The most significant approach in this respect is the *advocacy coalitions* approach by Paul Sabatier (1993, 1991). In contrast to the conventional network approaches based on the exchange of resources, Sabatier conceptualises the cooperation between actors in a policy area as a situation in which rival advocacy coalitions are pitted against one another. Internally, these coalitions are held together by a shared *belief system*. The approach is not only based on a different behavioural micro-foundation in comparison to exchange networks (normative action in contrast to strategic action), it also inhibits different assumptions

in respect to the dominant mode of interaction and the relevant structures. Whereas corporatism works on the structural basis of hierarchically integrated organized interested groups and relies on negotiations between top representatives of these corporative actors, advocacy coalition are formed by the joint mobilisation of its individual members through commonly recognised discourses.

Sabatier's approach and other approaches in policy analysis, which emphasize the significance of *frames*, discourse, and other cognitive-normative structures for the formation of collective actors (discourse coalitions) and for the development of political processes (see Schneider & Janning 2005: 154-195), should make us aware that in order to develop a comprehensive *governance* typology we cannot restrict ourselves to a rationalistic theory of action and the corresponding instrumental understanding of institutions. Instead, we must follow Schimank's approach and take into account various theories of action and the institutions and mechanisms, which correspond with these forms of action. To do so, it seems expedient to draw on the basic behavioural theories that exist in the social sciences as fundamental differentiation criteria for the development of ideal types of *governance*. In particular the differentiation between the *homo oeconomicus* (Kirchgässner 1991) and the *homo sociologicus* (Dahrendorf 1977) is crucial because these two views of man substantially correspond with the currently rivaling programmatic approaches to reform (*management* and *governance*). A core difference between the *homo oeconomicus* and the *homo sociologicus* is that the former has an instrumental and distanced understanding of institutions, while the latter has a constitutive and integrative understanding (see chapter 5.1 for a detailed characterisation). Yet one must also take into account that a series of different theories of action have developed for the *homo sociologicus* since the "normative paradigm" has been challenged by the "interpretative paradigm" (Wilson 1973 [1970]). In particular communicative action (*verständigungsorientiertes Handeln*) (Habermas 1981a, b) and symbolic, dramaturgical or performative action (Goffman 1959) as well as the most recent "discoveries" of emotional and prospective action must be accommodated in a *governance* typology, in order to adequately address the role of the media and non-incorporated collective actors (see chapter 5.3 for a detailed description of these forms of action/behaviour).

1.3 Conclusions for the development of a theoretically well-grounded typology of forms of political governance

The analysis of important contributions to the current *governance* literature results in three central findings:

- *Governance* approaches contain basic assumptions on the functioning of the social world not only when they are explicitly presented as political and programmatic reform concepts, but also when they are applied as analytical categories for the description (and explanation) of current processes of change. These ontological assumptions and starting points are contingent and their definition is

characterised by clear affinities to certain values and norms. A typological *governance* theory reveals the ideological and ontological affinities of specific forms of governing.

- In order for a typological theory of *governance* to provide a worthwhile contribution to the analysis and understanding of the current transformations of society, politics, and the state, it must be taken into account that forms of political steering and integration are conceptualised with regard to fundamental notions of social order. Therefore, it appears expedient to tap into basic theories of societal differentiation and integration.
- In order for a typological theory of *governance* to constitute a bridge between core social science disciplines, economic and sociological theories of action/behaviour along with the corresponding understandings of institutions must be taken into consideration. In this regard, it appears more promising not to integrate the different notions of action and institution in a meta-theory, rather to use them as complementary ideal types for the analysis and interpretation of reality.

I will draw on these findings in the following chapters and present the necessary theoretical foundations that a typology of *governance* has to build on.

2 Building blocks for a comprehensive and simultaneously differentiated typology of governance: Worldviews (*Weltbilder*), images of social order (*Gesellschaftsbilder*) and models of human nature (*Menschenbilder*)

In order for *governance* to become an analytical concept for the social sciences, which is able to overcome disciplinary boundaries without becoming shallow and fuzzy, a typology of basic forms of *governance* must be developed. On the one hand, this typology must be complex enough to grasp a wide range of temporally and spatially varying forms of *governance*. On the other hand, it must live up to a central imperative of scientific analysis – the meaning- and useful reduction of complexity. One-dimensional typologies, as can be found frequently in the *governance* literature, are adequate neither for grasping the variation of the empirically existing forms of *governance* nor for extracting the specific mechanisms of action (micro-foundations) of individual types of *governance*. The three-dimensional typology developed in the following aims to strike a balance between complexity and parsimony. Drawing on the findings from chapter 1 I will present three fundamental principles in this chapter, which will then be used as differentiation criteria for a typology of forms of *governance*. These three criteria should be of such a fundamental nature that they are adequate as a basis for trans-disciplinary ‘bridge-building’. In order to reduce the complexity, I will use dichotomous categories for mapping the possible expressions of the three criteria.

2.1 The stepwise development of the typology

The three criteria used to build the typology are called 'worldviews' (*Weltbilder*), 'images of social order' (*Gesellschaftsbilder*) and "models of human nature" (*Menschenbilder*) in order to indicate the aim to grasp absolute fundamental aspects of theory building. However, since diverse connotations are linked to these terms, it is clear that we will have to define them specifically for the purposes of this study, which will be done right at the beginning. The three criteria are significant for normative as well as for analytical and/or interpretative theories. The stepwise introduction of combinations of the criteria follows a deductive logic. First the most fundamental criterion is presented with the broadest area of application. Then I introduce the more specific criteria. In the end, the combination of three criteria will result in eight basic types of social coordination. Each type is based on a specific combination of worldviews, images of social order and models of human nature and provides the basis for the eight ideal-typical forms of governance outlined in the following chapter.

2.2 The core differentiation criteria for the typology

The term 'worldview' points to the most fundamental decision in the development of scientific theories. Worldviews are basic assumptions on how the world is functioning (descriptive or analytical meaning) or on how the world is supposed to function (normative meaning). In the first meaning, worldviews correspond to ontologies, basic assumptions on the type of entities that exist and on their relationships. Secondly, worldviews correspond also to ideologies as comprehensive conceptualisations of an ideal world. For theory building it makes sense to distinguish between holistic and elementaristic worldviews. In the humanities and social sciences, this distinction is reflected not only in the polarisation between collectivism and individualism, but also in various system theory approaches, as will be shown in chapter 3.

Within the social sciences, the "images of social order" (*Gesellschaftsbilder*) constitutes the second fundamental decision in the conceptualisation of normative and analytical theories. The term "image of social order" refers to fundamental assumptions on how societies are differentiated and what holds societies together (Schimank & Lange 2001). Two basic forms of societal differentiation and integration can be derived from the tradition of the sociological theories of societal differentiation and nationalism research: segmentary differentiation and mechanical integration on the one hand and functional differentiation and organic integration on the other hand. In chapter 4 I will first present the social science theories on which this distinction is based in order to illustrate in the next step that a holistic and elementaristic form can be found within both images of social order. The first two conceptual dimensions of the typology of forms of governance will already be linked at this level, before the third dimension is added as the next step.

“Models of human nature” (*Menschenbilder*) serve as the third differentiation criteria for the formation of a theory-based typology of *governance*. The most direct link to the *governance* discourse is located at this level. Two disciplinary *governance* perspectives are linked with the two fundamental models of human nature. Each image of human nature comprises a concept of human behaviour/action and the corresponding understanding of institutionalised structures. The two most important views of man in modern social sciences are the *homo oeconomicus* and *homo sociologicus*. These two *Menschenbilder* differ in particular with regard to the extent to which they grant actors autonomy vis-à-vis societal structures – in other words the extent to which they assume a differentiation between actors and structures/institutions. As for the *homo oeconomicus*, a substantial detachment between actors and institutionalised structures and a rather high level of autonomy of each is presumed to exist, while this is not the case with the *homo sociologicus*. As regards the *homo oeconomicus* this coincides with an understanding of social institutions as instruments serving and created by actors, whereas the *homo sociologicus* is connected to social structures in a co-constitutive fashion. This will be described in greater depth in chapter 5.1. Subsequently, these concepts will be linked with the two other differentiation criteria. I will demonstrate that the *homo oeconomicus* is not necessarily associated with a single worldview and a single image of social order, rather that all logically possible combinations have expressions in social science theory. The decisive difference between the various images of social order associated with the *homo oeconomicus* is what type of actor consistent preferences and strategic capacity are attributed to. The *homo sociologicus* is also not *per se* tied down to a certain worldview and to a specific image of social order. In chapter 5.3 I will show how the four logically possible combinations of the *homo sociologicus* with these two differentiation criteria are reflected in four different concepts of social behaviour.

2.3 The selective and instrumental reception of theories and theorists

Before these steps are explained in detail in the following chapters, it first must be emphasised that the following reference to basic theories and concepts is selective and instrumental. Basic concepts and traditions in the social sciences and central exponents of these traditions are only taken up insofar as it seems necessary and expedient for the objective of the theoretical part of this study: the development of a typology of forms of governance. This means that we cannot do full justice to the ideational origins of these concepts and that we do not take into account all aspects of the research paradigms in which these concepts have been developed. For example, the reception of Luhmann will probably draw critique from the experts on system theory, because I do not follow his epistemological stance. The reception of Luhmann focuses on those elements of his writings, which were drawn on in political and communication sciences and led to conceptual innovations (e.g. Willke 1992). Furthermore, since many great thinkers in

the social sciences (e.g. Durkheim) have undertaken significant conceptual changes in their writings during their lifetime, we have to specify clearly which conceptual elements we extract for our purposes.

3 World views: Holistic and elementaristic ontologies and ideologies

An analysis of the worldviews on which specific forms of governance are based has two aims. First, it provides governance theory with an ontological foundation and makes an explicit connection to one of the most fundamental distinctions in respect to theory building across all scientific disciplines. Second, it highlights the fact that all forms of governance have affinities to specific ideological stances.

One of the most fundamental decisions in theory building is whether to follow a holistic or an elementaristic approach. Elementaristic approaches assume that the behaviour of the parts of a system is determined by their internal properties and the entirety of the system is defined by the interactions of the autonomous individual parts and elements. Holistic approaches, by contrast, claim that the behaviour of the individual elements is defined by the entire system, i.e. that entireties have an ontological status of their own and are more than the sum of their individual parts (Esfeld 2003). In the field of political ideologies, the struggle between individualism and collectivism has been particularly strong since the beginning of the Enlightenment. As will be demonstrated shortly, the distinction between individualism and collectivism is not the only expression of the more fundamental differentiation between elementarism and holism, nor is it congruent with the distinction between the two models of human nature, *homo oeconomicus* and *homo sociologicus*.

3.1 Holistic versus elementaristic worldviews

Characteristic of the difficult separation of analytical-positive and programmatic-normative approaches in the humanities and social sciences is the fact that the major conceptual opposition in these sciences is often defined as holism versus individualism (e.g. Bergs & Curdts 2003). This is problematic, on the one hand, because a primarily ontological concept is juxtaposed with a primarily ideological concept. The ideological opposite of individualism is collectivism, not holism. The juxtaposition of holism versus individualism is also misleading because both concepts are not located on the same level of abstraction. The specification of the second part of the opposition (individualism) is more extensive than that of the first part (holism). Individualism refers to human beings, but there are other elementaristic points of departure for building social theories (e.g. autopoietic sub-systems). As we will see shortly, there are also multiple ways to specify holistic approaches to theory building.

Since the 1980s the opposition "micro – macro" has been used in sociology as the basic differentiation criterion for the categorisation of theoretical approaches (e.g. Alexander & Giesen 1987; Knorr-Cetina & Cicouel 1981). As Knorr-Cetina (1981) and Münch and Smelser (1987: 356/357) point

out, sociological theorists have very different notions of what exactly macro and micro mean. Heintz (2004: 3) reduces the four (Knorr-Cetina) and seven (Münch & Smelser) different meanings to two basic views. In the first case, the authors refer to "levels of reality": Micro comprises the individual, informal and "small" level. Macro, by contrast, pertains to the over-individual, organised and "large" level. In the second case, however, these concepts signify different "explanatory strategies", i.e. a "methodological collectivism" and a "methodological individualism".

As Heintz (2004: 3) explains, both perspectives no longer correspond with the current state of the theoretical discourse, which is characterised by a further differentiation. With regard to the "levels perspective", one no longer distinguishes between two, rather between three levels, because social science research has recently concentrated more and more on the level between the overall societal structure and individual action. Thus, situated forms of interaction and the structural patterns of interaction at the meso-level are taking centre stage in social science theories. The rise of the meso-level in social theory building leads to the question how the various social entities on the meso-level are integrated into an overall social system. Nevertheless, as will be shown in chapter 4, the various approaches within sociological differentiation theory, which provide answers to this problem of "system integration," are either based on a holistic or on an elementaristic worldview.

The distinction between methodological collectivism and methodological individualism also no longer reflects the state of the art. Instead, the various ways to conceptually *link* the micro- and macro-level are replacing the dispute over micro- versus macro-determination. This perspective is reflected in the debates about the relationships between structure and agency and the diverse mechanisms that constitute actors and structures (see e.g. Sztompka 1994). In contrast to the sociological concepts dealing with the problem of "system integration", for the approaches concerned with "social integration" the individual still takes centre stage.¹¹ The latter theoretical approaches concentrate on models of human behaviour/action and on the institutional contexts, which correspond to these behavioural models. I will address this in greater depth in chapter 5. Also here it will become obvious that the distinction between holistic and elementaristic approaches is still highly relevant and that all major theories of human behaviour and their corresponding understandings of institutions can be connected to both, holistic and elementaristic worldviews.

¹¹ The distinction between social integration and system integration can be traced back to Lockwood (1970). "Social integration refers to the principles by which individuals or actors are related to one another in a society; system integration refers to the (harmonious or conflicting) relationships between parts of a society or social system." (Lockwood 1970: 125; translation back into English, JB). Giddens (1997: 81) defines both terms differently: social integration is defined as "reciprocity" between actors in contexts of co-presence" and system integration as "reciprocity between actors or collective bodies across larger temporal and spatial spans." Alluding to Lockwood, I use "system integration" as a term that points to the various images of social order, whereas social integration refers to models of human nature with the corresponding conceptualizations of behaviour and institutions.

3.2 Various characteristics of holistic worldviews

Holistic approaches in social sciences comprise, above all, various features of macro-deterministic structuralism, but they also include Talcott Parson's structure-functionalistic theory. Macro-structuralistic thinking can be found in classical social science works, in particular those of Karl Marx and Émile Durkheim. Marx placed his main emphasis on material structures, while Durkheim shifted from focussing on material structures to placing greater emphasis on mental structures (systems of symbols). Claude Lévi-Strauss further pursued this trend all the way to a pure linguistic macro-structuralism (Turner 2003: 455-464). What these approaches have in common is that they attribute an independent ontological status to a specified structure level of the society. Societal structures are created by individuals, but they take on a life of their own and persist as reified social facts for a relatively long time period and independently of concrete actions and individual motivations.

Talcott Parson's structural functionalism is a particularly impressive and influential example of holistic theory formation both in terms of its behavioural as well as its system theoretical "shape". In his "voluntaristic theory of action" he synthesises utilitarian and idealistic as well as positivistic and hermeneutic approaches into a comprehensive theory of action, which he later elevated to the macro-level and transformed into a comprehensive theory of society. In modern societies, social sub-systems emerge (economic, political, social and cultural sub-systems), which fulfil specific functions for the system as a whole. In other words, social systems are determined by their functions for the system as a whole (Jarren & Donges 2002: 47). He combines this holistic functionalism with holistic structuralism by bringing the sub-systems into a hierarchical order, in which the cultural sub-system produces norms and values that steer the other systems and thereby integrate society as a whole. However, not only system integration, but also social integration is produced by a hierarchy, in which the cultural system provides the norms and values for the social system, which are in turn internalised into the personality system by processes of socialisation. This gave rise to macro-deterministic role theory in sociology, which assumes that society provides and sanctions roles, which are translated into actions by socialised subjects (Turner 2003: 44; Etzrodt 2003: 251-300; Schneider 1997: 168/169).

3.3 Different features of elementaristic worldviews

Elementaristic approaches comprise different streams of individualistic theories and specific expressions of system theories. Individualistic theories put the individual, his/her perceptions, intentions and actions in the centre of their attempts to explain and interpret the social world. They assume that society does not exist beyond individuals and that social processes must be explained on the basis of the actions of individuals (Zintl 1997: 33/34). *Rational Choice* theory with its basic assumption of the utility-maximizing and strategic behaviour of individuals on the basis of exogenously generated, stable, and consistent (intransitive) preferences is regarded as the individualistic approach *par excellence*. This approach

explains the formation of societal structures and institutions as a result of the fact that these instruments created by individuals can reduce transaction costs and solve collective action dilemmas.¹²

There is a series of additional individualistic theories, which are not based on an instrumental view of the relationship between actors and institutions. Taking American pragmatism as their starting point, Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel developed the theory of symbolic interactionism and Berger and Luckmann developed cognitive sociology. Both theoretical strands constitute highly individualistic approaches to social science theory. But in contrast to instrumental theories, not the exchange of objects, rather the social encounter or social communication is understood as the starting point of social processes. The relationship between individual actors and societal structures and institutions is not conceptualised as an instrumental-strategic relationship, rather as a constitutive-adaptive relationship. Just like in macro-deterministic theories of society, norms, roles and identities as well as cultures play a central role. However, the starting point for the development of such normative-cognitive schemes is no longer located in the functional needs of society as a whole, rather in situated constellations in which processes of interaction and communication lead to contingent norms and institutions.

Talcott Parsons with his structural-functional theory represents the combination of functionalism with a holistic worldview. In contrast, Luhmann's system theory exemplifies that functionalism can also be combined with an elementaristic worldview. According to Luhmann, the sub-systems are no longer determined by their function for the entire social system, rather they follow exclusively their immanent functional logics (or communication codes). Society as a whole thus develops into an evolutionary process of differentiation and uncontrolled interpenetration of these sub-systems. By emphasizing the self-referential reproduction of the sub-systems (*autopoiesis*) Luhmann's theory is the most consistently elementaristic approach among the functionalistic theories of society (see Jarren & Donges 2002: 49).

Elementaristic approaches are much less concerned with the overall intergration of society in comparison to holistic theories. Nevertheless, more or less explicitly they contain ideas on what holds the entire social system together, albeit in a much looser form that it is assumed in the holistic approaches. In the following, we will use the term "integration" in order to signify a holistic understanding of social coherence and coordination and "coupling" as the terminological signifier for elementaristic understandings.

The basic theoretical approaches in the social sciences, which have only been briefly touched on up to now, will be further elaborated on stepwise in the next two segments. In doing so, I will increasingly link them to specific forms of political steering and integration, so that we end up with a theory-based typology of forms of *governance*.

¹² Modern rational choice theory only constitutes the most important development in individualistic-instrumental theories. Forerunners to modern rational choice theory can be found in many classical works of economics (Smith), anthropology and sociology (e.g. Marx, Simmel) and in Homans' "behavioural exchange theory" (see e.g. Turner 2003: 285).

4 Images of social order: Segmentary versus functional differentiation and mechanical versus organic integration

How are societies structured, and what holds them together? These questions have been at the heart of the intellectual struggles of modern social sciences since their foundation in the mid-19th century. Answers to these questions depend above all on what model of social order one applies. The images of social order, which will be taken into account in the following, are the basic concepts within sociological differentiation theory.

The distinction between societies based on a segmentary differentiation and mechanical integration, and societies based on functional differentiation and organic integration, can be traced back to Émile Durkheim. In the following Durkheim's basic idea and the most important further developments in the sociological theory of differentiation will be outlined. I will supplement this theoretical strand with the literature that views the territorial segmentation of a political community and authority as the central characteristic of modernity. Afterwards, I describe the differences between the two images of social order once again by using concepts from network analysis in order to show that this distinction can also be conceptualised beyond modernisation theory. As a tentative conclusion, I will summarise the differences between the two images of social order. In the two subsequent chapters, I will demonstrate how we can observe a theoretical shift from holistic to elementaristic perspectives within both images.

4.1 Theories of social differentiation

4.1.1 Durkheim and Weber

Émile Durkheim is regarded as the founding father of a line of thinking in sociology that has been labelled "differentiation theory" (Schimank 1996: 27). Like all sociological classics, he develops his reflections on the principles of social differentiation and integration in the context of social modernisation. He distinguishes "sophisticated" from "simple" societies on the basis of the extent of the division of labour in society. The simple societies are segmentarily differentiated, i.e. they consist of many similar segments (e.g. family clans), between which there is a relatively low degree of social interdependence. The individual segments are to a high degree autarkic. Within the segments there is a certain division of labour among the members. This division of labour is however relatively weak and static, based on ascriptive criteria. By contrast, further developed societies are marked by high levels of division of labour, by a diversity of the functionally specialised segments and a high degree of interdependence among these segments. Durkheim describes both societal ideal-types by using analogies from nature and deduces his terminology for the respective integration mechanism from these analogies. Segmentary societies are compared with inorganic matter, in which the individual molecules do not move on their own, rather are firmly incorporated into the structure as a whole. Hence, Durkheim

suggests calling the principle of integration of this society "mechanical solidarity". In such societies there is a broad congruence between overall social values and the feelings and values of individuals. In these societies cohesion and solidarity are the result of the similarity between people (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 111-151). By contrast, societies based on the division of labour are compared with organic bodies in which every part of the body carries out a specialised function, which in turn contributes to the functioning of the body as a whole. In such societies, the individual parts are not completely determined by the whole, rather they have some leeway to optimize their functions. The corresponding "organic solidarity" no longer results from similarity, rather from mutual dependence and the reciprocal opportunities to increase their utility, enabled by the exchange of goods and services between the specialised units (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 170-172). At the institutional level, Durkheim combines the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity with the increasingly intense spread of "cooperative law" (in particular contractual, trade, administrative and constitutional law) in relation to penal law, which is the expression of a simple society (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 111, 163-169). He represents a holistic and optimistic tradition of thought, according to which integration is possible in principle also in a modern, functionally differentiated society. For him, the primer mechanism that holds these societies together is the recognition of mutual interdependence among its parts. Nevertheless, Durkheim distances himself from the purely contractual notions of social integration, as developed by Herbert Spencer. Necessary supplementary mechanisms for the integration of a society based on the division of labour are the sanctioning state, which is a remnant of the previously existing mechanical solidarity, and the development of new mechanical solidarity in professional associations, and above all, an ethic based on the voluntary commitment to meet the voluntarily reached agreements (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 268; Schimank 1996: 36-38).

Even though Max Weber seldom used the term differentiation, his studies on western modernisation are regarded as significant further developments to the theory of social differentiation (Alexander 1987). It is noteworthy that he – in contrast to Durkheim – did not explain the peculiarities of the occidental modern society by means of a highly simplified contrast to earlier, "simple" societies, rather by comparing them with non-western societies. It is also crucial that he localises social differentiation at the level of the macro- and/or meso-structures of society, whereas Durkheim was primarily describing the differentiation of individual roles as the result of growing labour sharing during the industrial revolution (Schimank 1996: 53/54). Finally, his conceptualisation of social differentiation has a markedly ideational orientation and is less based on the materialistic notion of labour sharing. According to Weber, the transition to the western modern age is primarily characterised by the pluralisation of "spheres of values" (*Wertsphären*), which take on a life of their own, while the value systems of other and earlier societies are characterised

by obedience to a monistic religion.¹³ The spheres of values establish themselves on the basis of ideational entelechies. Their relationship is not characterised by harmony and mutual exchange, rather more by conflicts (Schimank 1996: 60/61). This means that Weber no longer regards social sub-systems as a phenomenon of the division of labour as Durkheim did, rather as the differentiation and institutionalisation of "obstinate" spheres of values. Since there are no longer any objective mutual dependencies which lead to organic solidarity and the reintegration of society, he concentrates on another integration mechanism. He describes the core integration mechanism of modern societies as "legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff" (Weber 1985 [1922]: 124).¹⁴ Thus Weber distinguishes himself from Durkheim not only with regard to the logic of differentiation of modern societies, but also with regard to the core integration mechanism. This mechanism is no longer primarily based within society (solidarity), rather has instrumentally taken on a life of its own in the form of bureaucratic organisation and legal authority. On the one hand, the positivisation of law and the autonomy of specialised value spheres and organisations laid the groundwork for a free and dynamic society. On the other hand though, these formal institutions threaten to become independent from human control and turn into "iron cages."

4.1.2 The development of the segmentary Westphalian order

Durkheim developed the core principles and terms for differentiating images of social order. Furthermore, he came up with a rather clear-cut diagnosis that the western societies have been transformed from segmentarily differentiated social entities to functionally differentiated ones. However, by focusing on developments within national societies, this diagnosis tends to ignore a development which took place in parallel to industrialization and the associated socio-economic division of labour: the formation of a territorially defined system of sovereign states and the associated ideology of nationalism as a cultural "adhesive" for imagined communities (e.g. Delanty & O'Mahoney 2002: ix). Seen from this perspective, the process of Western modernization has to be described as a development in which the stratified differentiation of the feudal order increasingly made way for the segmentary differentiation of nation states.

The historical contingency of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states with a monopoly over the use of force throughout delineated territories and the significance of nations as the dominant

¹³ For example, within politics the quest for power is accepted as the legitimate value for which politicians are supposed to strive for, whereas in the economy it is the quest for profits. In his view, the occidental culture of rationalism which is based on scientific reflection and the formal observance of rules is the main driving force for the differentiation of spheres of values. Within these different spheres of values, the pursuit of values is institutionalised and optimised through the establishment of specialised bureaucratic organisations (Weber 1985 [1922]: 125-129, 551-579).

¹⁴ Weber hence attributes the formal, hierarchically structured organisations and the positive law possibilities to both mechanical as well as organic integration. Within the spheres of values bureaucratic organisations guarantee mechanical integration by granting members clear instructions with regard to their positions and roles and by applying the principle of equal treatment towards their addressees (Weber 1985 [1922]: 567/568). The state, which is based on the rule of law, mediates between the spheres of values by reducing tensions between the spheres of value by means of more and more detailed regulations (Schimank 1996: 66).

expressions of collective identities have increasingly re-entered the spotlight of the political and social sciences in recent years as a result of the fact that globalization might endanger or transform this system (Delanty & O'Mahony 2002: ix). Various authors emphasise the fact that the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states has been a relatively new phenomenon, which has developed since the Middle Age in Europe (Agnew 1999, 1998; Caporaso 1996; Ruggie 1993). The social and political order of the Middle Age was characterised by the overlapping and competing authority structures of feudalism, the church and empires. Due to the universal claims to authority of the personal hierarchies of the church and empires there was no differentiation between domestic and foreign policy and no separation of the public and private sphere. This system of overlapping orders of authority and loyalty was challenged during the transition between the Middle Age and modern age by new forms of political authority. During this phase, the territorially defined and sovereign nation state, which first emerged in England and France, prevailed against the German leagues of cities and the Italian city-states as competing forms of authority and became the generally accepted model of political rule in the Westphalian system (Spruyt 1994). According to Spruyt (1994: 158-172) the intra- and interorganizational advantages of territorially defined systems of authority lead to the success of this model of political order against its competitors. The internal hierarchy allowed for a standardization and thus economic rationalization and quick decision-making so that the territorial states enjoyed advantages when conducting war. The exclusiveness of authority, i.e. the clear divisions of territorial dominions and the internal monopolization and hierarchization of the structure of authority facilitated mutual recognition, because fewer conflicts over competences emerged and the credibility of the rules was increased.

The wide prevalence of this model of the sovereign territorial state signified a segmentation of the political world system. Membership in a national community became the core principle for political inclusion and exclusion. In a system of sovereign nation states, citizenship in a nation state is the precondition for civil and political rights and obligations (Delanty & O'Mahony 2002: xv). Furthermore, the nation emerged as the prime marker for political identification (Smith 1991). Overall, this narrative of the development of the Western world emphasises the process of segmentation. Identity and similarity provide the basis for coherence and stability of this system, both within the sovereign nation states and between the states.

Altogether, we have established that elements of both functional as well as segmentary differentiation can be found in the process of modernization in the western world (Peters 1993: 124-126). Depending on the level of analysis, one or the other process appears to dominate. Therefore, it seems premature to favour *ex ante* one or the other form of differentiation and integration if we want to grasp the current transformation of forms of *governance* in the Western world. Furthermore, such a limited view of major narratives of the process of Western modernization makes it obvious that we need some

further theoretical foundations in order to find out whether we are really witnessing the “transcendence of territorial, functional and sectoral boundaries” (Bang 2002, Benz 2004) or whether it is more appropriate to speak of further transformations from one form of differentiation and integration to another. Finally, it reminds us how important the level of analysis is for our investigations.

4.1.3 Segmentary and functional differentiation in terms of network analysis

Beyond these descriptions, which were linked to notions stemming from modernization theory, the differences between segmentarily and functionally differentiated societies can also be illustrated using the terms of network analysis, which draws on abstract notions of complexity theory. By doing so, the main links to a *governance* theory will become even more apparent than from a perspective based on modernization theory. The starting point is the definition of formal hierarchies by Herbert Simon (1962: 477). He viewed hierarchies as the dominant architecture of complexity in the modern era and defined hierarchies in purely structuralist terms as patterns of interaction with the property of *near-decomposability*. This means: “Intra-component linkages are generally stronger than inter-component linkages” (Simon 1962: 477). Kenis and Schneider (1991: 25) also define networks in purely structuralist terms and in direct contrast to Simon’s definition of hierarchies. As structural patterns, networks distinguish themselves from hierarchies precisely because the feature of *near-decomposability* no longer exists. The links to elements of other units no longer flow through a superordinate body (as in a classic bureaucracy). Cross-linkages to other units are so frequent that – compared to the internal linkages – they can no longer be neglected. In other words, lateral contacts across organizational boundaries (for example departmental boundaries) are so strong that no actor assumes a *gatekeeper* position anymore. Several points of intersection form in the interaction network, which enables us to define networks as polycentral structural patterns of interaction, while hierarchies are monocentral patterns.

Marin and Mayntz put their definitional emphasis on another form of closure towards the outside and on the aspect of membership instead of contacts. They distinguish organizations from networks primarily by arguing that the access to/the exit from and membership in an organization are explicitly and rigidly controlled and that this is not the case with networks (Marin & Mayntz 1991: 16). One can connect this definition also to the concept of *near-decomposability*. Organizations represent structures that are *nearly decomposable*, because cross-boundary fluctuations of participants or members are much more difficult and less common than internal fluctuations – the opposite applies to networks. If we link these structuralist definition elements with the two images of social order that we depicted before, the following can be said: Just like hierarchies, segmentarily differentiated societies have the properties of *near-decomposability* (monocentral structures of interaction which create gatekeeper positions, closeness and exclusivity in respect to membership), while functionally differentiated societies as networks are characterised by polycentricity, lateral contacts, and openness in respect to members.

Table 1: Differences between segmentary and functional differentiation

	Segmentary Differentiation	Functional Differentiation
Division of labour	Low	Strong
Interaction/interdependence	Limited	Intensive
Structural pattern	Near-decomposability	No decomposability
Integration/Coupling	Similarity	Interdependence

Table 1 summarises once again the main differences between the two models of social differentiation and integration. In the following chapters I will demonstrate how a shift from holistic to elementaristic concepts came about within the two models and how the notions of “integration” and/or “coupling” of social sub-systems thus also changed.

4.2 Holistic and elementaristic forms of functional differentiation and organic integration/coupling of societies

Durkheim and Weber’s descriptions of modern societies as functionally differentiated became the major starting points of sociological theorizing in the 20th century. In this chapter we will briefly scrutinise the main concepts of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann in order to demonstrate how sociological differentiation theory evolved from holistic towards more elementaristic understandings of the functional differentiation and organic integration/coupling of societies.

4.2.1 Talcott Parsons

Talcott Parsons (1951) draw heavily on the work of Durkheim when he developed his comprehensive theories. In his “voluntaristic theory of action” he synthesises utilitarian and idealistic as well as positivistic and hermeneutic approaches into a comprehensive theory of action. Later on he transferred the basic ideas into a structure-functional theory of society, whose theoretical core consists of a scheme of social sub-systems. In this scheme, four social sub-systems are viewed as functional requirements of social reproduction and it is assumed that societies are increasingly taking on such a differentiated form. The economic system provides the means to satisfy individual and social needs. The political system is responsible for setting objectives by means of binding decisions in the form of laws. The social system (*societal community*) consists of normative patterns, which produce both social control as well as loyalty. The cultural system (*fiduciary system*) provides normative, cognitive and expressive orientations for society. Parsons emphasises two types of mechanisms for the reintegration of these sub-systems. The first horizontal mechanism is described as *double interchanges*. This thus pertains to the exchange of

special means (money, power, influence, and values) between the sub-systems. Every sub-system produces such means and makes them available to the others. The second mechanism links the sub-systems vertically in the following sequence: the economic system is at the lowest position, then the political and the social system follow, and the cultural system at the highest position. Based on a principle of countervailing influence, the society is provided with energy from the bottom to the top, while the society is "tamed" and integrated by way of a control hierarchy from the top to the bottom (Schimank 1996: 103-117). This means that in Parson's theory both basic types of social integration are combined. The vertical integration mechanism generally corresponds with Durkheim's notion of mechanical solidarity, because the dominant ideas and norms that are produced in the cultural sub-system function as integrating mechanisms for all other sub-systems. The horizontal integration mechanism corresponds with the notion of organic solidarity, because it focuses on the mutual services of the sub-systems for one another and thus on their mutual dependence.¹⁵ Hence, Parsons further developed Durkheim's ideas into a comprehensive and integrative social theory. However, precisely this comprehensive integration of all previous approaches and the underlying holistic functionalism of his theory had the effect that challenging theories emerged in opposition to Parsons. On the one hand side, the social sciences witnessed the behaviour revolution based on a strictly individualistic ontology and methodology. On the other hand, an elementaristic turn also occurred within the macro-sociological theory of societal differentiation, which is embodied above all by Niklas Luhmann.

4.2.2 Niklas Luhmann

Niklas Luhmann transformed the theory of functional differentiation from a holistic to an elementaristic approach. He conceptualised societal sub-systems not as functionally specialised parts of an overall society based on the division of labour, rather as self-referential entities, which distinguish themselves from their social environment by developing their own communicative code. Thus he ties into Max Weber's concept of spheres of values and radicalises it by focussing on communication as the core procedure for social reproduction.¹⁶ Compatibility with the specific binary communication code is the basic mechanism for the integration of sub-systems (Luhmann 1998: 707-788).¹⁷ The sub-systems are

¹⁵ Yet by analysing different *generalised media of exchange* Parsons also takes a clearly more differentiated approach than Durkheim here. His approach of organic integration indeed remains holistic, because he regards the differentiation of the sub-systems and the different mechanisms of system integration as objective functional necessities of modern societies. At the same time though, his approach differentiates the mechanisms of organic integration much more distinctly than Durkheim's. These mechanisms bring about system and social integration by way of the effects that they exert on individual actions. Two of the exchange media constitute materialistic-instrumental forms of interdependence by acting as positive and negative sanctions, but without affecting the internal intentions of the actors: money and power. The two other exchange media are constitutive forms of integration, which target the attitudes of the actors: these are social influence and cultural values (Schimank 1996).

¹⁶ In contrast to Weber, Luhmann no longer regards positive law as a mechanism integrating society as a whole, rather as a sub-system of its own.

¹⁷ It is supplemented by two additional mechanisms: symbolically generalised means of communication (e.g. money for the economic system) and formal organisations.

neither vertically integrated, because there are no super-ordinations or subordinations between the sub-systems, nor are there harmonious exchange relationships between the sub-systems. Instead, the relationship between the sub-systems is seen as a result of evolutionarily processes of adaptation of the respective sub-system to its environment, which is constituted by the other sub-systems (Luhmann 1984: 645). Events in this environment trigger responses in the sub-system only as far as they are regarded as relevant for the *autopoietic* reproduction of the sub-system. Internal selection criteria determine whether and how external disturbances are perceived as positive stimuli for the further development of the sub-system or whether these disturbances are ignored (Lange & Braun 2000: 60).

4.2.3 Summary

Altogether two fundamentally different meanings of functional differentiation of modern societies can be identified in the macro-sociological literature. Durkheim identifies a process of differentiation and specialization with regard to social roles, while Parsons ascertains these processes at the level of societal sub-systems. Differentiation and specialization leads to enhanced productivity. The specialization of social elements (roles, sub-systems) is made possible by the resources these elements received through exchanges with other parts elements. Exchanges between the elements not only make further differentiation and specialization of social elements possible, the perception of mutual dependence that goes along with these exchanges secures integration for the society as a whole. Thus, at the core of their theory Durkheim and Parsons remain attached to a holistic worldview. For Max Weber and Niklas Luhmann, by contrast, the differentiation and specialization of values spheres and social sub-systems is the result of internal processes within these social elements. The specialization of the social sub-segments no longer occurs with a view to the exchange possibilities with other sub-systems, rather according to the ideational and communicative logics of the sub-system itself. The integration of society as a whole – understood as stability- and development-promoting order – is conceived of as loose coupling among the sub-systems. Sub-systems function as external stimulus for other sub-systems and force them to adapt to external pressures, but they do this according to their internal logics and therefore, the entire system is only “loosely-coupled.” Luhmann’s theory is thus an elementaristic theory. He does not conceive individual actors as the fundamental components of a social system, as most elementaristic theories do, but rather functional sub-systems of communication fulfil this role. His theoretical approach provides the macro-structuralist foundation for elementaristic concepts of interaction/communication, institutions and *governance*, which are not based on the anthropocentric view of humans/individuals as autonomous and coherent agents.

4.3 Holistic and elementaristic forms of segmentary differentiation and mechanical integration/coupling of societies

We turn now to images of social order that highlight the segmentary differentiation of the world. Similarly to chapter 4.2 I would like to demonstrate in this chapter that there are both holistically as well as elementaristically oriented concepts and theories. For the former theories Durkheim remains the main reference; the latter position is most prominent in the work of Anthony Giddens.

4.3.1 Émile Durkheim

According to Émile Durkheim, segmentary differentiation means that the elements of a society are very similar and that only a few interdependencies among the elements exist. He links segmentary differentiation exclusively to a holistic worldview and suggests two forms of mechanical integration of societies. On the one hand, he refers to mechanical solidarity, which results from the similarity of the parts. This similarity consists in the fact that the social and psychological consciousness of the members of society is highly influenced by the "collective consciousness" (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 147). Durkheim defines collective consciousness as follows: "The totality of the shared religious convictions and feelings of the members of the same society forms a certain system which has a life of its own" (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 121). However, since there is no complete congruence between individual and collective consciousness even in primitive segmentary societies, there are individual deviations from what society deems correct. In order to atone for these deviations from collective morality, societies require corporate bodies that are able to punish the deviating individual. This institutionalised punishment does not necessarily serve to correct the guilty party or to restrain imitators; rather "...its true task is to sustain social cohesion by upholding the full viability of the collective consciousness" (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 149). Hence, mechanical solidarity is based on cultural and administrative mechanisms, and his approach is therefore open to different models of human nature.

However, in the works of Durkheim both types of mechanisms are defined in such a way that they only allow for a holistic formation of segmentary societies. Furthermore, as shown by the quote rendered above, the collective consciousness in Durkheim's works is not really cultural in a narrow sense. Instead, it is defined religiously and affectively. According to him, the mechanisms are powerful because they are based on universal features of human behaviour: "The involved feelings draw their entire strength from the fact that they are common to the whole world; they are forceful, because they are undisputed" (Durkheim 1977 [1930]: 144). As will be shown later on, if culture or collective consciousness as a concept for integrating societies is liberated from the universal aspirations of religion and from the naturalist features of emotions, the door is open for less holistic cultural approaches to social integration.

4.3.2 Anthony Giddens

Anthony Giddens' "theory of structuration" represents an elementaristic approach within the strand of social theories that adhere to a segmentary worldview. Furthermore, he presents the process of *disembedding* as a core aspect of his understanding of modernization explicitly as a theoretical alternative to an understanding of modernization as functional differentiation (Giddens 1990: 21/22). Both aspects will be briefly laid out and some first hints will be given that Giddens' approach is compatible with the understandings of human behaviour and social institutions that correspond to the *homo sociologicus* as well as with those that correspond to the *homo oeconomicus*.

Much more clearly than Durkheim, Giddens emphasises the "duality of structure" – structural aspects like interpretative schemes and stocks of knowledge restrict but they also enable individual action. Furthermore, the term "structuration" points to the fact that in Giddens theory, social structures are being permanently created, recreated and transformed by actors in situations of interaction – in comparison to Durkheim, he conceives them as less comprehensive, stable and independent of individual action and social interaction. Structures are conceptualised as normative and interpretative rules as well as allocative and authoritative resources that actors use in interaction contexts that extend across space and over time. By using these rules and resources in this manner, actors sustain or reproduce structures in space and time (Turner 2003: 477/478). This situated and procedural understanding of structures reflects Giddens efforts to de-centre the subject without eliminating it. His understanding of agency takes into account institutionalised patterns and the interaction with others in the social context but it is an approach that is based on psychoanalytic theory, phenomenology, ethnomethodology and elements of action theory and in which the reduction of anxiety and the search for "ontological security" serve as the unconscious pressures that animates many activities. Between these structural and psychological features of Giddens' conceptualization of agency lies a model of human behaviour in which individuals reflectively monitor the actions of themselves and others through processes of rationalization and interpretation (Turner 2003: 483/484). Hence, Giddens' approach is clearly elementaristic (which does not mean atomic/autistic) as agency and situations of interaction are the basic building blocks from which the processes of structuration and the understanding of institutions are derived.

Institutions are seen as systems of interaction in societies that endure over time and that distribute people in terms of space. Giddens provides a typology of institutions in which each institutional type is characterised by the dominance of a specific rule or resource – e.g. political institutions are produced and reproduced mainly by the use of authoritative resources but in conjunction with interpretative and normative rules. For Giddens, the ontological security of agents as well as the institutionalization of structures in time and space depends on routinized and regionalized interaction among actors. Routinization gives continuity across time and regionalization places actors in place relative to one another and circumscribes how to present themselves and act (Turner 2003: 480-485). This leads us to

another important feature of Giddens' theory – the relevance of time and space in his approach, which allows us to speak of a theoretical approach that is based on a segmentary worldview.

Such a segmentary perspective is particularly obvious when Giddens introduces "disembedding" as his basic concept for the understanding of modernization. In contrast to concepts of functional differentiation the focus is placed here not on the increasing division of labour, the specialization of roles and social subsystems and the increasing exchange among actors and subsystems as central characteristics of modernization, rather on the "lifting out" of social positions and relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across new spaces of time and place (Giddens 1990: 21). The formerly natural and comprehensive integration of individuals into their local social milieu is lost in the process of modernization. This results in the necessity to select new "embeddings" into social contexts. In contrast to the theory of functional differentiation, this analysis focuses not so much on the integration into different social roles primarily defined by production-oriented organizations, rather on the "re-embedding" of individuals and social interactions into regional¹⁸ contexts, which restructure and redefine themselves through the incorporation of new individuals and the on-going interactions.

All major theoretical elements in Giddens' approach are conceptualised in such a pluralist way that they can be connected to various models of human nature, to the *homo sociologicus* and to the *homo oeconomicus* as they will be laid out later on. This is expressed in the multidimensional definition of structures as rules and resources as well as the combination of rationalist and interpretative elements in his conceptualization of agency. As we will see in the following section, there are indeed various elementarist approaches in the social sciences which are based on a segmentary image of social order and in which regionalization takes centre stage for conceptualizing the re-embedding of individuals who are lifted out of their traditional social context. We can find them in the literature on public choice and fiscal federalism (see chapter 5.2.2) as well as in the field of cultural studies, where "performance" as situated and structured activity aiming to attract attention and identification have become a major approach for conceptualizing human behaviour in (post) modern societies (see 5.3.2).

4.4 Summary

The different notions of social integration and/or coupling can be summarised as follows (see Table 2). According to *holistic* views of the world the overall societal integration of *segmentary* sub-units relies on the common identity of the parts, which in turn rest on their formal similarity and on their socialization into a collective culture. The social integration of *functionally differentiated* societies occurs, by contrast, as the result of the interdependency among the parts, which is the result of a complementary and partly overlapping assignment of specialised functions to divergent parts of the society. The interdependency

¹⁸ The ambiguity of the term "regional" makes it possible to link all kinds of spatial entities to this concept.

forces the parts to cooperate and to develop means of coordination in order to enhance the overall functioning of the system.

Table 2: Forms of societal integration/coupling in segmentary and functionally differentiated societies

	Segmentary differentiation	Functional Differentiation
Holistic	Identity and Hierarchy formal similarity; socialization/familiarization and formal organisation	Interdependence and Coordination functional specialization; complementing and overlapping competences and forced cooperation
Elementaristic	Individuality and Security formal autonomy; mutual attention/attraction and regional re-embedding	Autopoiesis and Adaptation functional self-referentiality; mutual externalities/exchanges and selective incorporation

According to *elementaristic* images of the social world, integration of the society as a whole no longer takes place in the strict sense, because these views of the world start with the assumption that the prime goal of social systems is the autonomous self-determination of individuals and local entities or the autopoietic reproduction of social subsystems. Yet implicitly or explicitly they always contain assumptions on how the multiple parts of the society are held together – albeit in a loosely coupled manner. Within segmentarily differentiated societies, a loose form of societal coupling occurs through the attention which the various elements pay to each other. Mobile individuals pay attention to the material or cultural performances of local communities in their search for an attractive location to re-embed themselves. Local communities pay attention to the activities of mobile individuals as well as to the activities of other competing local communities in order to keep or lure attractive inhabitants. The coupling of *functionally differentiated* parts of society occurs, by contrast, in the form of mutual adaptations between self-referential subsystems. The specialised subsystems create positive and negative externalities for other subsystems, which will be taken up by these other subsystems in accordance with their internal criteria and codes for reproduction and development.

The presented theories and reflections on societal differentiation and integration/coupling primarily focused on the meso-level of society (or on the aspect of system integration) without implying a specific single model of human behaviour or a specific notion of social integration. Precisely this conceptual decoupling of system integration and social integration allows us to freely combine the various concepts of system integration and social integration in the upcoming development of ideal-types in chapter 6. Before doing so, we must gain an overview of the most important concepts of social integration comprising a specific model of human behaviour and the corresponding understanding of institutions.

5 Models of human nature: Instrumental and constitutive theories of individuals and institutions

In the social sciences, basic models of human nature and individual behaviour are one of the most prevalent starting points for theory development. The two most important models of human nature, the *homo oeconomicus* (Kirchgässner 1991) and the *homo sociologicus* (Dahrendorf 1977), have been anchor points for the emergence of corresponding independent social science disciplines.¹⁹ Very often the *homo oeconomicus* is associated with an individualistic or elementaristic view of the world, while the *homo sociologicus* is strongly connected to a collectivistic or holistic worldview. Furthermore, it often seems that the *homo oeconomicus* makes his choices in an institution-free environment, whereas the *homo sociologicus* is fully determined by institutions and has no choice at all (Schimank 1996: 72). This chapter will show that neither of these assumptions holds. Instead, I argue that each model of human nature is based on a specific conceptualization of individual behaviour or action²⁰, an understanding of the nature of transactions or interactions and on a corresponding concept of social and political institutions (for the same stipulation, see e.g. Powell & DiMaggio 1991: 16).²¹ Furthermore, it will be shown that both models of human nature can be linked not only with elementaristic and holistic worldviews, but also with the two scrutinised images of social order. For the *homo sociologicus*, the combination of this model of human nature with various worldviews and with divergent images of social order takes place through the development of different conceptualizations of social (inter)action (for a similar argument: Alexander & Giesen 1987: 15). For the *homo oeconomicus*, in contrast, it is more appropriate – especially in light of our purpose to develop a typology of forms of governance – to connect this model of human nature with different worldviews and different images of social order by distinguishing between different types of actors who are supposed to act strategically. But first we have to scrutinise the basic characteristics and differences between the two most important models of human

¹⁹ Of course there have been overlaps between the disciplines time and time again, in particular because disciplinary models of human nature and behaviour were transferred to the empirical fields originally occupied by the other discipline. Such imperialism can be observed in the massive penetration of rational choice theory into sociology (promoted by economics such as Gary Becker as well as sociologists such as James Coleman und Hartmut Esser); on the other side, the Nobel Prize for Daniel Kahneman in 2002 is impressive evidence of the fact that economic theory is increasingly incorporating sociological elements into its behavioural models by means of the concept of *bounded rationality* (albeit with a detour through psychology). Bruno Frey (2001: 11) writes in his book with the ambiguous title "Inspiring Economics: Human Motivation in Political Economy" that the decreasing profit resulting from the economic imperialism in the other fields of social science now should have the effect that economics is inspired in its own right by other academic disciplines.

²⁰ In the following we will primarily use the term "action" instead of "behaviour" for both models of human nature precisely because I want to stress the fact that in all recent conceptualisations of the *homo sociologicus* she is not perceived as an externally determined enactor of social structures, but it is assumed that the *homo sociologicus* has some leeway for interpreting and influencing the institutionalised context. This does not mean that she is conceptualised as an autonomous actor with exogenously determined preferences and identities.

²¹ In their overview of the patterns of development of sociological theory, Alexander and Giesen (1987) pointed out that a link between rational choice theory and an individualistic-elementaristic theoretical architecture and a link between the interpretative theory of action and a holistic-collectivistic theoretical architecture – as is frequently the case in political science – is by no means imperative and that there have been other links in the history of sociology as well. The link between a micro-approach and an interpretative theory of behaviour can be found in pragmatism (Mead), in psychosanalysis (Freud) and in symbolic interactionism (Blumer, Goffman). For Alexander and Giesen (1987: 15) Marxism can be interpreted as a connection between a macro-approach and rational choice theory.

nature in the social sciences. It is important to point out that the following differences are in accordance with all conceptualizations of the *homo oeconomicus*, which will be presented in chapter 5.2 and all conceptualizations of the *homo sociologicus* that are laid out in chapter 5.3.

5.1 Homo Oeconomicus versus Homo Sociologicus

The decisive difference between both models of human nature is not that the *homo oeconomicus* embodies an elementaristic worldview and the *homo sociologicus* a holistic one, rather that the *homo oeconomicus* has an instrumental relationship to other actors and social institutions, while the *homo sociologicus* has a constitutive relationship to them. This shall be outlined in detail in the following and summarised in table 3.

A conceptualization of human behaviour based on the *homo oeconomicus* assumes that actors behave strategically, which means that they have a clear set of goals, order the options available in a specific situation according to these goals, and try to maximise their utility in accordance with these preferences. The motives, goals, objectives and interests of the *homo oeconomicus* are defined exogenously of social interactions by biological, psychological and social needs and by individual predispositions; in consequence, the preferences are quite consistent and relatively stable. Therefore, James March (1994) speaks of the *logic of consequentiality*, which defines the actions of the *homo oeconomicus*. Furthermore, he characterises the *homo sociologicus* as acting according to the *logic of appropriateness*. The actor derives the appropriate behaviour from his/her individual identity and from the internalised norms and expectations that are connected to specific positions and roles he plays in a society. Usually, the *homo sociologicus* is described as an actor who follows the norms and rules that correspond to his/her individual identity and the expectations that are connected to a specific role without paying attention to the costs and benefits that result from this behaviour. But that is not the only possibility to conceptualise the *homo sociologicus* as we will see later on. In some of the following dimensions we have to differentiate between two distinct understandings of the *homo sociologicus*.

5.1.1 Transactions versus interactions and communications

A first major difference that becomes apparent when we look at the conceptualization of the *homo oeconomicus* and the *homo sociologicus* in the social sciences is the fact that the encounter between multiple social actors is described quite distinctly. Whereas the *homo oeconomicus* in his quest to reach the goals that he has set for himself realises that he depends on the actions of others to do so, for the *homo sociologicus* the encounter with other social actors basically centres around the question who she and the other is. In the first case, the social encounter is focussed on a specific object, goal or purpose (e.g. reducing pollution or enhancing welfare by trading), whereas in the second case these encounters are primarily perceived as moments for the (re)construction of individual and collective

identities/relationships. An indication of this is the fact that the term *transaction* prevails over the term *interaction* in economic theories of human behaviour and social institutions (e.g. Esser 2001; Williamson 1996). This reflects the fact that the social encounter focuses on an external object that is beyond the two actors as such. In theories and research approaches that are based on the *homo oeconomicus* it has first to be defined in respect to what the actors recognise an interdependency and in respect to what they calculate the potential costs and benefits of their available options. The relationship between the actors as such does not play a major role and the actors are conceptualised as being indifferent to each other.

As we have already indicated and will scrutinise in more detail later on, the identity-centred understanding of the *homo sociologicus* has been complemented by a communication-centred one, which corresponds to the presupposition that modern society is functionally differentiated. In these conceptualizations, the *homo sociologicus* is less concerned with identity-making, but rather with sense-making. Many theorists have abandoned the notion of actors and (inter)action in favour of purely structuralist theorizing, but as we will see later on, it is possible to identify specific implicit micro-foundations for the most important understanding of communication-centred conceptualizations of the *homo sociologicus*.

5.1.2 Egocentric versus Alter-centric and combined orientations

In the basic applications of game theory it is assumed that actors indeed take into account the behaviour of other actors, because the result of the interaction depends on the decisions taken by the other actors. Nevertheless, when assessing the available alternative options they look only at their own costs and benefits (see e.g. Etzrodt 2003: 69-151). In his conceptual approach to actor-centred policy analysis, Fritz Scharpf adds the aspect of "interaction orientation" to the classic conceptualization of a game as based on the "interest constellation" (Scharpf 1997: 85-89). While the interest constellation represents the actually available set of potential payoffs given the objective interdependencies and subjective preferences of the actors, the interaction orientation represents the inter-subjective relationship among the actors. Scharpf's typology of interaction orientation helps us not only to get a clearer idea of the differences between the *homo oeconomicus* and the *homo sociologicus* but also to point to the fact that there are different expressions of the *homo sociologicus*. The *homo oeconomicus* is characterized by a self-centred or egocentric interaction orientation, i.e. actions and decision-making options are evaluated exclusively on the basis of the costs and benefits for him. The costs and the benefits for the other actor(s) are only taken into account, if they have repercussions on one's own costs and benefits. The *homo sociologicus*, by contrast, is characterised by the fact that for her the relationship with the other actor plays a decisive role in the assessment of the potential results of interdependent actions. Alternatives are evaluated especially with an eye on the expected costs and benefits for the other actor(s).

What is especially revealing in Scharpf's typology (1997: 84-87) is that he realizes the plurality of non-egocentric interaction orientations. Furthermore, it becomes obvious that the crucial element of all interaction orientations beyond the egocentric one that is associated with the *homo economicus* is the fact that Alter plays the decisive role in the evaluation of potential outcomes of the considered transactions. First, Scharpf identifies two interaction orientations in which the evaluation of the alternatives takes only the consequences for Alter into account: Whereas an "altruistic" interaction orientation means that the actor chooses the alternative that benefits Alter most, a "hostile" interaction orientation leads to a choice that represents the worst option for Alter. In both cases, the own costs and benefits of Ego are not taken into consideration. Second, there are two kinds of interaction orientation that take both the consequences for Alter and the consequences for Ego into account: the "competitive" orientation that resembles the "relative gains logic" in the literature on International Relations. Actors with such an orientation subtract the potential gains of the other from their own potential gains in order to find out which option yields the best result in comparative terms. The second interaction orientation is called "solidaristic" by Scharpf and coincides with a "we-based identity" in which the costs and benefits of the other is understood as something that is equal to one's own utility and the actor evaluates the options according to the sum of the resulting utilities for Alter and Ego.

Overall, for the *homo sociologicus* it is decisive with whom interdependencies exist and with whom social interaction takes place, as the same objective potential outcomes are evaluated differently depending on the general social relationship with the interaction partner. In contrast, the *homo oeconomicus* takes into account the other, but only to the extent that he can derive a specific behavioural expectation from him that has an influence on his own pay-off; as for the evaluation of the potential results of their interaction, the *Alter* remains something foreign and external to him.

5.1.3 Instrumental versus constitutive relationships between actors and institutions

Not only other actors, but also institutions comprise something objective and external to the *homo oeconomicus*. As a strategic actor, the *homo oeconomicus* takes into account in his actions both institutions as well as interdependencies as objective context conditions, which can restrict but also expand his/her realm of possibilities. Institutions also do not influence his/her internal motivations and goals. This gives rise to a specific understanding of institutions that corresponds to this understanding of human nature. Social and political institutions constitute formal and explicit rules as well as material and extrinsic incentives for action. The individual actor takes these formal rules and material incentives into account in his/her decision-making process, because his actions will be positively or negatively sanctioned, i.e. rewarded or punished, by agents who are in charge of enforcing or executing the institutionalised norms. A further cultural or ideational impact of institutions on actors' construction of meanings (perceptions, identities) is often explicitly ruled out (see e.g. Rothstein 1996: 147; Mayntz &

Scharpf 1995: 45/46). In other words, institutions and ideas/culture are conceptually differentiated. Accordingly, institutions are viewed as instruments to reduce transaction costs in new institutional economics (Williamson 1996). Transaction costs emerge in situations in which the individual pursuit of objectives requires actions to be coordinated with other actors. Institutions primarily reduce transaction costs by defining rights and obligations as well as by rules with regard to information dissemination, participation and decision-making. Furthermore, monitoring and sanctioning authorities have to be established (see the description in Braun 1999: 235/236).

By contrast, the understanding of human nature based on the *homo sociologicus* is associated with a mutually constitutive understanding of actors and institutions. Institutions are conceptualised not as external context conditions rather as normative, cognitive and/or affective points of reference, which play an important role in the internal construction of meanings and preferences by individuals. They shape the actor to a significant degree, by not only influencing his/her strategies, but also his/her identities and interpretative frameworks and subsequently his/her perception of situations as well as his/her behaviour. Hence, the identity and behaviour of individuals is not determined 'exogenously' – through psychological dispositions and natural needs, for example – but strongly shaped by social institutions (and social interactions). In other words, the level of autonomy that actors and institutions are granted towards each other is much less substantial than in the case of the *homo oeconomicus*. Institutions and actors are not conceptualised as something external to one another; rather they reciprocally penetrate each other.

This notion of reciprocal penetration applies not only to the influence of institutions on the identities and behaviour of actors, but also to the significance of actors for the existence and effectiveness of institutions. According to the *homo sociologicus*, institutional guidelines primarily take effect as a result of their internalization and thus their existence and effectiveness strongly rely on (inter)subjective perception and validity. This means that the effectiveness of institutions depends not so much on their capacity to provide material incentives and external sanctions, rather on their powers of socialization and of attracting attention. Hence, the understanding of institutions transcends formal, explicit rules and material incentives and also comprises informal, non-explicit rules in particular as well as immaterial, discursive frameworks and communicative stimuli for action. Above all though, the emphasis is placed on the creation of meaning and the resulting mobilizing effect that formal and informal institutions inhibit. Therefore, sociological institutionalists particularly stress the role of symbols, rituals, role models and discourse (Göhler 1994 and 1997; Rothstein 1996: 147/148; March & Olson 1989).

5.1.4 Uncertainty versus ambiguity

Both views of wo/man thus place different emphasis with regard to the problem of actions under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. While in the case of the *homo oeconomicus* the problem lies in anticipating the consequences of actions, the main problem in the case of the *homo sociologicus* is

assessing the currently appropriate identity. However, both complexity problems are of a very different nature. According to James March (1994: 178/179) this difference can be expressed in the distinction between "uncertainty" and "ambiguity". Uncertainty refers to the lack of clarity that exists with regard to the future outcome of the current actions. In rationalistic theories, the uncertainty over the actions of other actors plays a decisive role, as one's own payoff is dependent on their actions. According to this approach, there are an objective reality, unambiguous causality, and clear results, which become apparent over the course of time or by means of additional information. Social and political institutions, which produce unambiguous knowledge (truths) about causal relationships, clear and sanctioned rules of conduct and norms and thus calculable probabilities about the behaviour of others, help to solve the problem of uncertainty.

Linked to the concept of ambiguity, by contrast, is a relativistic view of the world, in which there are no mutually exclusive states of reality, rather multiple and diverse interpretations. Given the multiple and by no means mutually exclusive identities of (post-) modern wo/man and the diverse interpretative frameworks of a culturally differentiated (post-)modern society, the problem of ambiguity is particularly pronounced. If social institutions are supposed to reduce the problem of ambiguity, they must increase the perception and importance of a specific identity of the individual or a specific interpretative framework for the definition of a situation. In other words, they must provide answers not to the question "what is the right thing to do?" but to the question "what is the relevant thing to do?"

5.1.5 Corporative versus collective actors

In both models of human nature, institutions do not only emerge as rules and norms but they constitute new forms of actors beyond the individual human. Within the framework of rational choice theory, legal regulations constitute corporative actors and formal organizations with more or less distinct legal, financial, and personnel autonomy. These formal organizations are particularly stable and efficient instruments for the rational pursuit of collective goals in cases of strong interdependencies. However, they also tend to take on a life of their own, because an information asymmetry evolves between the principals and agents (Coleman 1974).

Within sociological theories, the corresponding forms of new actors are collective actors or groups and movements held together by a common identity. According to Scharpf (1997: 54) the difference between corporative and collective actors lies in the extent to which the entity has taken on a life of its own in relation to the individual actor. Esser (2001: 39-41) distinguishes in a similar vein between organizations and associations and defines the core difference to be that associations – in contrast to organizations – are bound to the identity of their individual members. Organizations, by contrast, are anonymous entities that only define "positions", which can be held by any given individual actor independent of his/her personal identity and belief system.

In sum, table 3 highlights the fact that for the *homo oeconomicus* institutions are instruments to facilitate and to limit the realization of exogenously developed goals of action, while in the case of the *homo sociologicus* institutions primarily play a role in the constitution of the identity of individual actors and the corresponding perceptions and motivations. The core mechanisms that institutions have to facilitate the transactions that the *homo oeconomicus* aims to undertake are a) providing information in order to reduce uncertainty, b) clear rules of decision-making and c) means of control for both, for the principal in relation to the incorporated agent and for the formal organization that is in charge for implementing the will of the principal in relation to the members of the collective entity. Institutions have to provide the following mechanisms for the *homo sociologicus*: a) clues that help to identify the prior points of reference in a situation in order to reduce ambiguity, b) stimuli that mobilise individual action and c) features that introduce coherence in the joint actions and interactions of collective actors.

Table 3: Differences between instrumental and constitutive theories of actions and institutions

	Homo Oeconomicus	Homo Sociologicus
Type of actions and encounters	Strategic action Transactions	Social action Interactions and Communication
Actor orientation	Egocentric (Ego)	External (Alter – often together with Ego)
Understanding of institutions	Institutions as external context conditions of human behaviour	Institutions as internalized points of reference for human behaviour
Functions of institutions for actors	Instrumental: Enabling and limiting the realization of (exogenously developed) goals	Constitutive: Expressing and creating perceptions and identities
Functions of institutions for society	Steering	Integration
Specific mechanisms of institutions	Facilitation of transactions: information, rules of decision-making and means of control	Facilitation of interactions: identification, mobilization and coherency
Function of information	Reduction of uncertainty	Reduction of ambiguity
Type of non-individual Actors	Organizations Corporate actors	Groups and Movements Collective actors

The adjective “instrumental” is very frequently linked with notion of institutions being deliberately designed and reformed, while the counter-term refers to the uncontrolled emergence of institutions (e.g. Powell & DiMaggio 1991: 8). This is misleading as far as one implies that no deliberate attempts are made to shape non-instrumental institutions and no possibilities exist to do so. However, as we will see in the empirical part of the study, in earlier as well as in more recent times, it is exactly what political reformers tried to do – i.e. to deliberately develop constitutive institutions. But as we will see as well, the

design and set-up of constitutive institutions appears to be much more difficult and less consequential if they are not transferred into or accompanied by instrumental institutions.

The following two subchapters are intermediate steps towards formulating coherent ideal-types of governance whereby each form of governance represents a specific configuration of a worldview, an image of social order and a model of human nature. The main goal of these chapters is to illustrate that for each of the four possible combinations of the two worldviews and the two images of social order, we find theoretical approaches that are in accordance with the *homo oeconomicus* and theoretical concepts that are in line with the *homo sociologicus*. Furthermore, I want to demonstrate that in both cases we can observe the trend that holistic-segmentary approaches are being supplemented and partly supplanted by approaches, which are based on an elementaristic worldview and towards approaches, which presuppose functionally differentiated societies and polities. For the *homo economicus* this will be done with references to the sovereign nation state and to normative theories of federalism since this literature focuses on the formal structure of the polity. Predominantly, the relationship between the society and the polity is perceived to be instrumental and not constitutive and the underlying concept of strategic action remains the same. The latter is not the case in respect to the *homo sociologicus*, for whom we have witnessed important theoretical reconceptualizations in respect to social action. In chapter 5.3, I draw on concepts from various fields of the humanities and the social sciences in order to illustrate that we nowadays find conceptualizations of social action that correspond to our four possible combinations of worldviews and images of social order.

5.2 Different conceptualizations of instrumental institutions

In the following I will illustrate with reference to various theories of federalism (for overviews see, for example, Prätorius 1989; Duchacek 1987 [1970]; Deuerlein 1972; Friedrich 1968) that there are quite different starting points for justifying and specifying political structures which are supposed to be instrumental in the pursuit of goals attributed to collective and to individual actors. For the first concept that corresponds to a holistic worldview and a segmentary image of social order, I will briefly point to the sovereign nation state since it represents best the basic features of this ideal type. Nevertheless, I cannot delve deeply into the vast literature that deals with the characteristics of the sovereign nation state, but instead will point to the fact that in the theories of federalism we also can identify a justification for a federated polity that is very much in line with this ideal type. By concentrating on the theories of federalism I would like to show that even within a circumscribed field of theorizing we can detect all threads that lead to our four ideal types of instrumental forms of governance. Of course, there are many more theories in the social sciences, which correspond to the basic features of our ideal types.

5.2.1 Centralised States for Implementing the Will of Coherent Communities

In chapter 4.1.2 we have described the emergence of the Westphalian order of territorially demarcated and sovereign nation states as a sign of the relevance of a segmentally differentiated order in modern times. We have also pointed to the fact that nationalism provided the ideological cement that allowed for the conception of the nation as a homogenous community for which a militarized and bureaucratized state served as the instrument for fulfilling the national will. Furthermore, the assumed or produced cultural homogeneity of the citizens made it possible to implement majority rule as the decision-making modus for deriving the common will of the people when the sovereign nation states became democratized. While in republican concepts of democracy like in France, the state was perceived as constitutive for the nation building process, in liberal approaches like in the Anglo-Saxon world or in conservative understandings of the nation building process like in Germany the national community was perceived as a preconstituted entity that emerged on the basis of a common social, communicative, cultural or ethnic bonds.²²

The basic features of the modern nation state with the "imagined community" (Anderson) of the nation and the centralised and bureaucratized state as the instrument for fulfilling the will of the nation's people are generally acknowledged as the foundations of the modern political world order. However, it is less frequently recognised that in the normative theories of federalism there is also an important strand which bases the normative claim for self-governance of specific political communities on the same line of argument and ends up with the same consequences for designing the institutional structure of a federation. Especially in Canada, but also in Switzerland, the main justification of a federated state structure is based on the argument that within the boundaries of the country there are multiple communities with distinct cultures. These communities are perceived as internally homogeneous, territorially concentrated and pre-existing to the formation of the modern sovereign state. In consequence, these communities are seen as the most fundamental units of the political system, entrusted with a general competence of decision- and law-making in all policy fields except those they decided to delegate to the federal (or local) level (e.g. Duchacek 1986, Kinsky 2004: 290-299; Gagnon 1988; Gibbins 1987; Kinsky 1986: 90-97). Such an understanding of federalism shares two basic features with the notion of a Westphalian world order (beyond the instrumental understanding of the relationship between society and polity): a) the assumption that the social world is segmentally/territorially differentiated; and b) the presupposition that there are pre-existing communities which are entitled to govern themselves as autonomously as possible. The institutional design of the governance system follows suit and has to make sure that the will of the homogeneous community can be fulfilled within its

²² The various approaches to nation building can also be found in the works of historians. Gellner (1999) argues that national cultures should be viewed as normative standards set during industrialisation, Hobsbawm (1991) stresses that the territorial state created nations, Anderson (1985) highlighted the importance of written language and the thereby facilitated communication over a wide area, and Wehler (2001) and Giesen (1998) point to the influence of intellectuals.

territorial demarcation. Efficient decision-making by majority vote, comprehensive competences in a broad range of policy fields and on a coherent territorial bases as well as a centralised and professionalized public administration are the major characteristics of such an institutional design. The following theories of federalism do not share those presuppositions and therefore end up with different institutional propositions.

5.2.2 Clubs Catering to Security and Services for Individual Agents

The turn towards individuals as the crucial actors in positive and normative theories of federalism represents the turn away from holism towards elementarism without giving up an understanding of social order that is segmentarily or territorially differentiated. Within the theories of federalism, the first approach that corresponds to such a move is William Riker's approach that introduced methodological individualism in this field of research (Riker 1964, 1975; Volden 2004, Filippov 2005). He proposes that in order to understand the origins and the working of federal systems one has to look at the interests and motivations of politicians. Influenced by the history of the United States he argues that an external threat or opportunity is a necessary condition for making the leaders of political units willing to give up some independence and to form a union. The politicians must see it as beneficial for themselves to join such a union. In other words, he describes federal states as security alliances, which are established when political leaders perceive the situation as such that they can secure their autonomy best by giving up parts of it.

For the endurance of federal systems Riker presumes that it is necessary that the electoral competition be institutionalised on a decentralised level, which gives regional politicians a pivotal position in determining the fate of politicians on the federal level. Riker's approach is elementaristic in the sense that he introduced methodological individualism to the positive and normative analysis of federal systems. Nevertheless, he saw political leaders as primary agents. At the same time, economists took an even more elementaristic stance by conceptualizing the mobile individual as the main actor who has to be taken into account when designing institutional systems of democratic governance. Charles Tiebout's famous essay "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures" (1956) and James Buchanan's seminal piece "An Economic Theory of Clubs" (1965) started what became to be known as club theory (Sandler & Tschirhart 1980). Especially Tiebout's approach is based on a segmental image of social order because he analyses and evaluates different political systems under the premise that mobile households look out for municipalities that offer them the best "package" of public goods and costs according to their individual preferences. Tiebout argues that decentralised political systems are superior to centralised ones. A first reason is that they allow people to divide themselves into rather homogeneous communities (sorting). This enhances allocative efficiency, since the supplied type and level of services can more easily be brought in line with a more homogeneous demand. Furthermore, Tiebout argues that a decentralised

and fragmented political system stimulates competition among the municipalities, which in turn strengthens productive efficiency since the municipalities try to enhance the relationship between input (costs) and output (quantity or quality of service) (Dowding & Mergoupis 2003: 1190). Overall, Tiebout's account of club theory still assumes that the political system is comprised of territorially demarcated political entities with a rather broad spectrum of competences. Nevertheless, the main mechanism for social steering and control of the political system is no longer voting but "exit." In order to highlight the functional equivalence, the physical movement from one municipality to another one is called "voting by feet." The main instruments for political steering, on the other hand, are the system of taxes or fees for the provided public goods and – beyond Tiebout, who presumed a free mobility – the regulation of "entry", for example through exclusionary zoning (Sandler & Tschirhart 1980).

5.2.3 A Compound Republic for Funnelling Factions

In particular in the American federalist tradition, which is rooted in the *federalist papers*, the federal structure of the state and the two chambers of parliament are viewed as elements, which contribute to the reciprocal control of various groups (factions) of society (Madison, Federalist No 51). The different sizes of the electoral districts for the two chambers of parliament are supposed to ensure the representation of distinct groupings. Particularly decisive for the concept of a *compound republic*, however, are the constitutive and institutional provisions that ensure that the representatives of different groups have to work together and have to find compromises. The institutional differentiation of various levels of government is complemented by a system of interlocking competences, which demand inter-governmental negotiations and compromises (Ostrom 1987 [1970]). Thus the political idea of *checks and balances* requires a combination of structural differentiation and structural integration at the same time. The more the latter aspect is institutionalised, e.g. by shared tasks and competences between the various levels and departments of government, as well as between the two chambers of parliament, the more the institutional design resembles a holistic worldview. Madison explicitly proposed the compound republic as a means to provide a second way of controlling the government. Not only the citizens control their governments through regular voting – the various branches and levels of government control each other. Although the final goal was to secure the liberty of individuals and the rights of minorities, the crucial innovation is to recognise organizational units as major (corporate) actors within the political system.

5.2.4 Congruent Corporations for the Optimal Assignment of Functions

Within the economic theory of federalism we can discover a strand of theorizing that is also based on the idea of functional differentiation, the so-called *fiscal federalism* (Olson 1969, Oates 1972, Breton & Scott 1980). In contrast to the political theory of federalism proposed by the authors of the *federalist papers*, fiscal federalism does not put much emphasis on the re-integration of a functionally differentiated

system of government, in consequence it embodies a much more elementaristic worldview. The main argument for a federal system with multiple levels of government is that it allows for a better distribution of state responsibilities and authorities to various levels with different territorial scales/group sizes than a centralised system, in which all functions of the state are assigned to the same level and therefore cover the same territorial scale or size of group. In contrast to club theory, which we have described before, different means are proposed to reach allocative and productive efficiency. In order to enhance allocative efficiency, the principle of "fiscal equivalence" must be secured, which means there must be congruence between those who profit from the goods, those who pay for them and those who make the decisions. This goal is not reached by mobile people who divide themselves into homogeneous communities with similar preferences but by adjusting the territorial scale of governmental units in such a way that all those who profit and pay are included in the decision-making process.²³ The means for strengthening productive efficiency is not competition among territorial multi-purpose entities (municipalities) in order to attract inhabitants, but the building of single-purpose governments with optimal sizes according to the production process. Since there are specific optimal sizes for every public good due to different production conditions it is necessary to have different political-administrative levels with a different spatial reach and a different size of population. Like the political approach that starts with the recognition of various factions within the society, the economic approach that focuses on the production and financing of divergent public goods and services puts organizational units or corporative actors at the centre of interest when conceptualizing the institutional structure of political systems.

5.3 Different conceptualizations of social action

In the following I want to scrutinise the ways and directions in which the assumptions about the behaviour of the *homo sociologicus* has been modified since its original linkage to normative action. We can distinguish two trends. The first trend can be described as a shift towards elementarism. Instead of assuming that people are *role takers*, thereby enacting the scripts that are provided by society, social action is understood as *role making* and as *identity making*, which both lead to highlight the features of "performances". A second trend in conceptualizing social action puts interpretation and communication into the centre of theorizing and follows the assumption that society is more and more differentiated into functional sub-systems with specific communicative codes (see chapter 4.2). While Habermas' theory of communicative action can be understood as holistic approach which tries to regain coherence in social interaction and to pave the way towards consensual politics while accepting the fundamental plurality that comes with functional differentiation, more and more elementaristic concepts are emerging which envision no strong form of social interaction or societal integration anymore. Prospect theory provides

²³ Even though the argument of fiscal equivalence is related to people or groups, it is usually automatically transferred to territorial spaces in the *fiscal federalism* literature, see e.g. Pitlik (1997: 81).

the micro-foundation and a theory of social action that is in line with an elementarist conceptualization of a functionally differentiated society that is structured primarily by competing discourses and interpretative frameworks. In this chapter we will concentrate on the different conceptualizations of social action; the connection to the corresponding understandings of institutions and mechanisms of governance will be laid out in chapter 7, where the distinct forms of governance will be laid out as analytic ideal-types by bringing together the various insights of the forgoing chapters.

5.3.1 Normative action

The classical theory of social action that is associated with the *homo sociologicus* is based on norm-conforming behaviour within the framework of social roles. The normative paradigm assumes that institutionalised social norms “enforce” certain actions on behalf of individuals. In other words, they are ‘casting moulds’ for individual actions (Durkheim 1885). This paradigm is driven by the anthropological assumption that humans are no longer instinctively pre-programmed and thus demonstrate a fundamental lack of ontological uncertainty. Social norms and institutions reduce this uncertainty by providing a meaningful means of orientation. After Durkheim laid its foundations, the normative paradigm was primarily reflected in the structure-functionalistic theory in which social roles take centre stage (Dahrendorf 1977). Roles are linked to certain behavioural expectations, whose compliance can be sanctioned by social reference groups. These roles are primarily learned in everyday social life when individuals internalize social norms by means of socialization processes. The social norms that guide human behaviour are institutionalised either formally or informally and comprise expectations as to what must be, can be, and should be done (Schimank 2000: 38-55).

Normative action goes hand in hand with an understanding of social institutions that have a high degree of temporal stability and a strong impact on individual identity and behaviour. These institutions can be formalized (they don't have to), but they influence individual behaviour and social interaction primarily through the fact that their normative prescriptions are internalized (in addition, most theorists acknowledge the relevance of formal mechanism of sanctioning, which – when we depict ideal-types – corresponds to the institutional features in correspondence to the *homo oeconomicus*). Furthermore, the concept of normative action is based on the assumption that the institutional context comprises a comprehensive set of social norms and roles, which are integrated by a common culture.²⁴

²⁴ Role theory does not assume the existence of simple or traditional societies, rather modern societies with a multitude of reference groups. Just as Max Weber transformed the functional division of labour within bureaucracies back into a holistic and essentially segmentary concept by means of the principle of hierarchical integration, role theory does the same for cultural orientation by means of the integration of the diverse role segments into a comprehensive set of role. The conflicts and incompatibilities between the role segments are indeed addressed (e.g. in Merton's work), but essentially the notion is upheld that the existing normative parameters of the roles lead to relatively harmonious social integration, because society provides possibilities for hierarchizing and thus integrating the different role expectations (Schimank 2000: 48-59).

5.3.2 Performance

With roots in the American philosophy of Pragmatism, much more elementaristic understandings of social interaction have been developed during the 20th Century. Symbolic Interactionism, developed by Herbert Blumer and Manford Kuhn and the dramaturgic perspective most forcefully introduced by Erving Goffman, have been the most important starting points, but there are more recent expressions like the theories of identity formulated by Sheldon Stryker, George P. McCall und J.L. Simmons as well as by Peter J. Burke (Turner 2003: 368-383) and the sociological approaches which focus on the role of emotions in social encounters (Turner 2003: 438-441). Turner clusters these approaches under the heading of "interactionist theory" since the core feature is that these approaches derive their understanding of social behaviour, identities, norms and institutions no longer by connecting it to functional needs of society but as emerging properties of social encounters. While the normative model of social action was strongly connected to macro-theoretical concepts, the various strands of interactionism are much more micro-theoretical in their orientation. The situative encounter of social actors is emphasized, and the context is not seen anymore as one that is populated by reference groups but by an "audience" in front of which the social actor has to present him-/herself. This allows the actors to interpret and enact the social scripts in a more subjective way. Overall, it led to a revision of role theory, most clearly formulated by Ralph H. Turner, in which not *role taking*, i.e. the conforming implementation of predetermined scripts, rather *role making*, i.e. a creative, expressive and innovative interpretation of the role, represents the paradigmatic understanding of social action. In various fields of cultural studies and the social sciences, the term "performance" has become widespread in order to distinguish this strand of reconceptualising social behaviour not only from the normative paradigm, but also from the more language- and communication-centred approaches, which emerged as further alternatives (see e.g. Alexander, Giesen & Mast 2006, Martschukat & Patzold 2003; Soeffner & Tänzler 2002; Wulf et al. 2001). The term "performance" emphasises not only the fact that social actors create and not just enact characters (Turner 2003: 396/397), but it highlights the role of audiences and the relevance of gaining attention. Szerszynki, Heim and Waterton (2003: 3) define a performance as an "event", an activity through which presence is created. In the following, I dig deeper into some theoretical aspects of this concept in order to demonstrate that it expresses an understanding of social action that is not only elementaristic but inhibits a segmentary image of social order.

The elementaristic orientation of performative action

The elementaristic orientation is demonstrated by the fact that these approaches are based on a distinct *bottom-up*-perspective, i.e. that the origin and the (limited) stabilization of patterns of social orientation are derived from the specific interaction process in concrete situations. The normative paradigm emphasised on the one hand the "objectivation" of social norms and belief systems into social facts and

on the other hand the strong penetration of the individual by social norms through the “internalization” of these norms in processes of socialization. The interactionist theories, by contrast, emphasise the permanent production and the innovative and transformative reproduction of patterns of social orientation in situated contexts of interaction. This means that the “decentralization” and pluralisation of social norm production that goes along with these theories in comparison to the normative paradigm is accompanied by a “destabilization” of social behaviour, norms, identities and institutions and by a “decoupling” or liberalization of what the social actor presents towards the external world from his/her internal traits or internalized norms.

The first aspect takes us away from coherent and comprehensive cultures and role sets as starting points for conceptualizing social behaviour and interaction. In interactionist theorizing, those comprehensive normative-cognitive structures and institutions give way to an image of society that inhibits a multiplicity and plurality of cultural patterns of orientation in different milieus and localities.

The second aspect implies a shift of emphasis from the past to the present when conceptualizing the structural context that shapes the behaviour of the *homo sociologicus*. The normative-cognitive structures that guide the action of the *homo sociologicus* are not conceptualised anymore as the results of an “internalization” of social norms and values in the historical process of socialization. Instead, they emerge out of a situated process in which the social actor “identifies” the currently most important partners for interaction, the relevant audience and presents him-/herself in such a way that (s)he gains attention and appreciation. Overall, gaining attention through expressive *performances* becomes a very important aspect both for the actors and for social institutions (Fischer-Lichte 2001; Wirth 2002). This leads to a quite different specification of what the “logic of appropriateness” (March 1994) actually means, since performances reach their goal not by delivering the expected or “normal” but by new, surprising and creative actions which raise awareness exactly because they disturb the normal way of social life and contradict expectations. In the context of our endeavour to develop ideal types of political governance, which are based on specific and distinct behavioural micro-foundations, it makes sense to stress the fact that “performative action” is conceptualised as being “situated” in the sense of being embedded in specific places and times. For the conceptualization of social action, this implies a strong orientation towards the “present”, in contrast to normative action that puts an emphasis towards the “past” since it stresses the importance of tradition and processes of socialization. By stressing the orientation towards the present, we can distinguish performative action also from strategic action and cognitive action, both of which are future-oriented, because they assume that current actions are driven by calculated possible/probable consequences or by framed prospects (for the latter, see the following section).

The third important aspect points to the fact that the notion of performance implies that the actor can perform activities which have nothing to do with his/her internal interests, values or norms. The

principal liberation of the performative expressions towards an external audience from any essential or internalized traits shifts the emphasis in respect to what social norms actually regulate away from any substance to form. To put it in a nutshell, it is less important what you perform but how you perform. Nevertheless, such a liberalization of external appearances from internal traits is accompanied by a search for re-coupling and – ironically – leads to a cult of authenticity, which in turn leads us to the role of emotions.

The emotional heart of performative action

Emotions have been rediscovered in all fields of the social sciences and the humanities at the beginning of the 21st century and almost all theoretical approaches have started including emotions in their conceptualizations of human cognition, communication and behaviour.²⁵ In the communication-centred approaches that we will address next, this has been done for example by accepting rhetoric as a legitimate tool for communicative action (Dryzek 2010) or by recognizing the role of emotions in the cognition-centred Prospect Theory (McDermott 2004a, Druckman & McDermott 2008), approaches that will be laid out next. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for making the argument that emotions are particularly relevant for an understanding of social interaction as performance, and these reasons are linked to the aspects that we have just presented as indicators for the elementaristic leanings of performances.

The first reason has to do with the “presentism” of performances. Scholars have highlighted the insight that emotions, due to their synthetic-simultaneous manner of processing information, allow for quicker reactions to changes in the environment than cognitive modes, which are based on a linear-sequential processing of information (Schimank 2000: 109; Gerhards 1988: 80). Emotions therefore play a central role in situations, which require quick reactions, especially in situations of existential threats (Marcus 2002: 99-132). Furthermore, emotions mobilise action without channelling the action into a predetermined direction. Emotions are one-dimensional, i.e. they are perceived as positive or negative and as strong or weak; a differentiated weighting with several dimensions and evaluation criteria is not possible (Schnabel 2005: 283). In consequence, emotions primarily influence the willingness to take action, but they cannot provide sophisticated guidance for a specific kind of action.

These features distinguish performative action from the other conceptualizations of social (inter)action. Internalized norms also allow for quick (re-)actions, because there is no need for reflection and internal decision-making, but the established routines work only in familiar and stable situations. In

²⁵ Emotions have become one of the most important topics in the humanities and the social sciences in recent years. The interest in emotions has been triggered by the “naturalistic” challenge that the neurosciences present for the humanities and social sciences. Neuropsychological studies revealed not only the importance of emotions for human action, they implied that emotions have biological foundations and universal features. In reaction, social scientists tried to show that emotions or at least their expressions vary according to cultural and social contexts. Important contributions to the neuropsychological and philosophical debate have been Damasio (2002), Ankowitsch (2002), Williams (2001) and Parkinson (1995); sociological accounts are represented by Flam (2002, 2000), Shilling (2002), Turner (2000) and Gerhards (1988). The first political scientists who discovered emotions were Marcus (2002, 2000) and McDermott (2004a) in the United States and Klein und Nullmeier (1999) in Germany.

situations characterised by complexity, multiplicity and flux, emotion-driven intuitive reflexes substitute for established routines. In contrast to strategic and communicative action, performances are “reflexive” but not “reflective.” Action and reaction are spontaneous; there is neither an intensive reflection in the sense of instrumental rationality (what are the consequences of the various options?) nor in the sense of communicative rationality (what is the most reasonable option?). Finally, in contrast to cognition-focussed conceptualization of action, the core feature of emotion-driven performances is to provide orientation in respect to which aspect of a situation or an issue demands the most immediate (re)action (the focus is on temporal priority). Cognitions-centred approaches, in contrast, focus on two other functions which are provided by the communicative context of social (inter)actions: Public discourses influence collective and individual priming, which means that they provide orientation in respect to which aspect of a situation or an issue is most important (the focus is on salience or relevance), and they influence the collective and individual framing of a situation or an issue, which means that they provide orientation in respect to which interpretation or evaluation of a situation or an issues is most appropriate (the focus is on valance or normative validity).²⁶

The second reason to associate emotions with performance as a conceptualization of social action that is embedded in a segmentary image of social order has to do with the fact that emotions are more strongly connected to the human body than cognitions. Emotions can be shaped or manipulated by cultural or institutional contexts and they are open for individual fabrication, albeit only to a certain degree because they are much more linked to physical impulses than cognitions (Schnabel 2005: 283; Gerhards 1988: 99-102). For this reason emotions demonstrate authenticity. Authenticity, in turn, is seen as highly valuable in a world of dramaturgical action and performances. It brings back some “ontological security” that has been lost when social action has been “liberated” from internalized values and norms. Emotions are thus of crucial significance for the emergence of situated trust, which cannot draw on experiences (see DiMaggio 2002; Jones 1996). The strong connection of emotions to the human body speaks for the primer assignment of emotions to theories that put the identities and actions of individual and collective actors at the heart of theorizing and not communication. In other words, the emotional heart of performances connects them to theories of identity and to a segmentary conceptualization of the society.²⁷

²⁶ As we will see below, there are some forms of cognitive framing (those highlighted by Prospect Theory) that are also characterised by stimulating action without providing orientation on the direction of this action. Maybe at this point it is prudent to make the reader alert (again) that we are aiming to develop distinct ideal-types. Real forms of social action and most theories of social action are characterised by mixtures and overlaps.

²⁷ Berezin (2002: 42) has also alluded to the fact that the recognition of emotions as important elements in the formation of individual and collective identities leads to a greater awareness of the importance of the natural environment and the territory in comparison to pure social-constructivist approaches to identity formation.

The (trans)formation of identities through performative action

The construction of the "self", or of a "centred identity" is seen as the major goal of social encounters in interactionist theorizing (Turner 2003). Interactionist theories are closely linked to anti-essentialist concepts of identity (see e.g. Reckwitz 2001; Seidman & Alexander 2001: 306-402). Individual and collective identities are not conceptualised in an "objectivistic" manner with regard to primordial attributes and ethnic affiliations. Instead they are regarded as the result of the interplay between an expressive presentation of one's self-perception through the display of a coinciding *image*, processes of social affirmation, and the attribution of characteristic traits by others (Schimank 2000: 128).

Compared to pragmatism and symbolic interactionism though, we have witnessed further changes or additions in the understanding of personal and collective identity formation in recent decades. The most important changes in our context has been most strongly perused by researchers in the field of post-colonialism and feminism (e.g. Said 1979, Young 1990), and more recently in research on the role of identities in ethnic conflicts (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke & Tambini 2002). These approaches stress the significance of "difference" in the development of individual and collective identities. Experiences of discrimination and perceptions of being dominated by "others" represent crucial triggers for the constitution of particular collective identities. In a further twist, scholars focussed on the practise of creative combination of different identities ("creolization"), which means that identity theory went back to discover the kind of creativity that pragmatism assumes as being at the centre of social action (Lash & Fasherstone 2002; Reckwitz 2001).

Altogether, these conceptualization of identity formation stress the following aspects of social interaction which have to be taken into account when we want to reflect on the corresponding forms of governance: the formation and transformation of identities and social interactions is strongly influenced by the attempts of actors to present an attractive image of oneself to each another and to a wider audience and a precondition for these presentations is mutual attention. Distinction, creativity and innovation as well as "face-work" (Goffman 1955) or image management are more important than coherence and correspondence to an "internal reality" since the first and decisive step for identity creation is gaining attention, which in turn increases self-esteem and self-consciousness. This reduces the need to gain social recognition by following dominant norms. Nevertheless, the natural limits to fabricating emotions, the need to show the actual working of innovations as well as the search for authenticity in a world of staged appearances provide incentives to combine image building with concrete practices in the form of performances, public events or visible projects.

A first reflection on the corresponding understanding of institutions and mechanisms of governance leads to the following conclusions: In comparison to the understanding of social institutions that corresponds to normative action, institutions that result from and at the same time shape performances are less stable and less comprehensive. They offer orientation not so much by highlighting established

values and prescribing the appropriate behaviour through a hierarchical ordering of roles and prescriptions but by highlighting the currently most important contexts and by stimulating innovative and transformative reactions. The core mechanisms and tools are images/visual communication and aesthetic projects, which are primarily aimed at generating attention, arousing emotions and mobilizing activities. In a nutshell, the structural or institutional context that is created by social (inter)action and that shapes social (inter)action resembles what might be called an environment of “branded cults” in distinction to the “established culture” that guides normative action.

The second trend in developing an understanding of social actions and institutions that is distinct from the normative paradigm is characterised by “decentering” of individuals and collectivities and by a “desubjectivization” of social relations. This trend leads into a quite different direction in comparison to what we have outlined just before in scrutinizing the concept of performative action. The following concepts of social (inter)action are in correspondence with the assumption that the society is functionally differentiated and presuppose that the coherent actor gives way to multiple selves who may or may not be brought into coherence through communicative processes. The theory of communicative action, which I will present first, assumes that such a reintegration of social action and society is possible through the capacities and inclinations that a shared language and life world provides. Afterwards, I turn towards cognition-focussed theories of social (inter)action. The central concept of “framing” provides the interface between communicative actions and structures on the macro-level of society with core features of information processing on the micro-level of individual actors. Frames bridge the macro- and micro-levels of social information processing but they inhibit no underlying inclination for integrating the various perspectives and positions that exist in a functionally differentiated society. Integration takes place only in a loosely coupled form; usually different discourses and frames compete for recognition and dominance in specific policy fields, which leads to mutual stimulation. Nevertheless, in the most elementaristic conceptualizations, not dominance or hegemony but co-existence and co-evolution characterise communicative structures and actions that are shaped by discourse and frames.

5.3.3 Communicative action

The most important and widely recognised theory of social interaction that puts communication into the centre of theorizing is the theory of communicative action established by Jürgen Habermas (1981). Although Habermas (1981b: 583) has developed the theory of communicative action as a normative concept or a regulatory ideal, the boundary to its use as an analytic concept for describing and explaining social actions and processes is porous and it has made inroads into analytic research projects in the Social Sciences (e.g. Risse 2000, Deitelhoff 2009). In a similar vein as Parsons had done before, Habermas pretends to integrate those models of social (inter)action, which we have scrutinised so far (normative,

symbolic and instrumental approaches), into a comprehensive and synthetic approach. Nevertheless, the linguistic underpinnings of his theorizing lead to a distinct focus in his understanding of social interaction as communicative action. According to him, the main goal that actors try to accomplish in social encounters is to reach a shared understanding of the situation and an agreement in respect to the appropriate actions through an exchange of arguments and a reflective re-evaluation of their own position. The assumption that a common language and a shared life world provide the underpinnings for reaching a joint understanding and the presupposition that validity claims within the process of argumentation have to be made with reference to universal principles (in contrast to individual interests, particular values or local norms) make the theory of communicative action a holistic concept. The actor is perceived to be rational and reflective, but not in the self-centred and instrumental way that the theories of strategic action and rational choice assume, but in the sense that social actors justify their beliefs and preferences by claiming their validity with reference to universal principles.²⁸ With the help of the “forceless force of the better argument” social and political communities are able to reach a consensus on common goals and preferred actions. The persuasive power of arguments as well as participative, non-coercive and consensus-oriented institutions and procedures makes it possible that the participants of deliberations recognise and accept the outcomes of the joint deliberation as justified, which eliminates or reduces the need for coercive means of implementation (Habermas 1981: 44-71, 369-452).

The holistic character of Habermas’ approach is also reflected in his model of society, to which the concept of communicative action is connected. With reference to Durkheim and Weber, Habermas argues that a de-coupling of “social systems” and the “life world” of individuals characterise modern societies. Within social systems, integration or coupling takes place through the non-normative mechanisms of exchange and power. This leads to an increasingly strong autonomization (*Verselbständigung*) and “objectification” of the systems “state” and “economy” (Habermas 1981a: 137-257). By distancing himself from Marx and from Luhmann, Habermas insists on a primer status of the norm-guided life world as compared to social systems and their non-normative modes of social coordination, but he fears the colonialization of the life-world by the functional imperatives of the economic and administrative systems (Habermas 1981a: 293).

A simultaneous modernization of the normative mechanisms of coordination that are characteristic for the life world makes it possible to resist the colonization. The differentiation and abstraction of norms, which characterise this modernization, means that the normative-cognitive structures that guide social action are less and less shaped by tradition and religion. Instead, they are created (as well as contested and transformed) by communicative processes characterised by mutual justification and the exchange of arguments. Through communicative processes of justification and argumentation it is possible to reach

²⁸ „Allein die Wahrheit von Propositionen, die Richtigkeit von moralischen Handlungsnormen und die Verständlichkeit bzw. Wohlgeformtheit von symbolischen Ausdrücken sind ihrem Sinne nach universelle Geltungsansprüche“ (Habermas 1981a: 71).

shared understandings and agreements between actors who are connected to different systems but share a common language and a life world. The forging of consensual policies, covenants and constitutions makes it possible that a political community can defend its democratic self-determination against the imperatives of functional sub-systems, without the need to fall back into a pre-modern homogeneous society.

Overall, this leads to a distinct understanding of institutions. Social interaction and communication is no longer guided by an inherited culture but by self-determined conventions, covenants and constitutions. And the analytic focus is directed towards those structures and processes that shape the creation of these normative agreements. Although the mass media is taken into account, it is quite telling that most theorists of deliberative democracy, who have taken up Habermas conceptualization of communicative action, are focussing much more on the civic society, social movements and on specific deliberative forums like citizens assemblies or citizen juries (e.g. Hendriks 2006, Dryzek 2009).²⁹ In contrast, the mass media plays a much more important role within the literature that focusses on what can be called "cognitive actions" as we will discover in the next section.

5.3.4 Cognitive action

In order to find conceptualizations of social interaction that are based on the premises of a functionally differentiated society but inhibit an elementaristic instead of a holistic world view, we turn to theories and research programs that connect communicative structures on the macro-level of society to the cognitive features of information processing within actors.³⁰ I will point briefly to some of the foundations for this strand of theorizing and to more recent expressions of the "cognitive turn" within Political Science in order to point to the fact that they presuppose a functionally differentiated society.³¹ Next, I present insights from cognitive psychology and communication research to shed light on how public discourses in the mass media influence social (inter)action by shaping the attitudes and opinions of citizens and elites.

Cognition-centred theorizing has its roots in the social phenomenology of Berger and Luckmann ([1966] 1971), the anthropology of Gregory Bateson (1972), and the symbolic interactionism of Erving Goffman (1974). It received its most popular recognition in the work of the cognitive psychologists Daniel

²⁹ Only the most recent turn in deliberative democracy theory tries to focus again on the entire communicative system of modern societies (e.g. Parkinson & Mansbridge forthcoming, but even here, the mass media remains at the margin).

³⁰ Given the fact that I have pointed to Niklas Luhmann's system theory as expressing the combination of a functionally differentiated image of social order and an elementaristic world view most clearly on the level of general social theory, it would have been possible to present those approaches that show how Luhmann's theory can be connected to actor- and action-centred theorizing (for an excellent overview see Braun 2000).

³¹ Since at this point, I want to trace the micro-foundations that are in line with these worldviews and images of social order, I only marginally deal with theories/theorists that are strongly structuralist (e.g. Michel Foucault). Nevertheless, later on the structuralist concept of "discourse" will be introduced as an adequate conceptualisation of communicative structures that trigger the social mechanisms of priming and framing which, in turn, stimulate and steer the attention and actions of social actors. Furthermore, I will not elaborate on Hartmut Esser's attempt to incorporate cognitive structures into his individualist theory of choice. He recognises the importance of frames but assumes that people select frames deliberately (2001: 259-334).

Kahnemann and Amos Tversky (1979, 1984).³² These approaches, which are all focussing on the micro-level of communication and information processing, have been connected to research that concentrates on information processing and communication on the macro-level of societies in the burgeoning field of communication studies. This field of research has investigated the cognitive effects of political communication in the mass media on attitudes and opinions in the population and stressed the relevance of agenda setting, priming and framing (e.g. Koch 1998, Hallahan 1999, Scheufele 2000, Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007).

Another line of theorizing has focussed on rhetoric as a mode of communication that applies linguistic means and speech acts strategically in order to succeed in a debate and not for reaching a shared understanding, as is the case with the concept of communicative action. The concept of rhetoric has been strongly connected to strategic action and applied by prominent proponents of methodological individualism (e.g. Riker 1996). Nevertheless, more structurally inclined scholars have pointed to the fact that rhetorical communication leads to an "entrapment", since it enforces some coherence in argumentation over time, which in turn reduces the strategic leeway of communicative actors (Schimmelfennig 2004, Krebs & Jackson 2007). Interestingly, most scholars who recognise the triadic structure of rhetorical communication, ideal-typically comprised by two speakers and a more or less attentive audience, link the concept of rhetoric to the concept of framing, which has become the core concept in mass media research (e.g. Koch 1998, Krebs & Jackson 2007). In consequence, I will concentrate in the following on the mechanism of framing (and priming) when describing the micro-foundations through which public discourses influence social (inter)action. In contrast to the concept of rhetoric, these concepts express much better the "structurationist" underpinning (the co-constitution of structure and agency) that characterises the *homo sociologicus*. Rhetoric has not only strong affinities to strategic action but also to a segmental image of social order; not by accident, it is primarily applied in explanatory political science in the context of polity or community making (Riker 1996, Schimmelfennig 2004, Krebs & Jackson 2007). Cognitive theories, in contrast, have strong affinities to an image of social order that is characterised by functional differentiation because they have primarily been employed in theoretical frameworks that try to explain policy making or cooperation in specific policy fields.

The functionalist elementarism of cognitivist theories in political science

Cognitive theorizing has made inroads in many fields of political science; above all in international relations, in frameworks for public policy making, and in research on social movements (Nullmeier 1997: 110-127). The most important representations of such a "cognitive turn" in political science (Nullmeier 1997: 115) are J.W. Kingdon's work on *agenda-setting* (1984), the *epistemic community* approach in international relations pioneered by P.M. Haas (1989, 1992), Rein and Schon's work on *framing* and

³² Daniel Kahnemann received the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002.

discourse (1991), and the *advocacy-coalition framework* that Paul Sabatier (1993) developed together with H.C. Jenkins-Smith (1999). The analytic focus of these approaches are the normative and causal claims and beliefs that motivate, mobilise and holds together the members of these communities and coalitions in the process of policy-making and implementation. Although these analytic frameworks have taken actors into account, the micro-foundation of these approaches has remained weak (Nullmeier 1993: 112) and individual or collective actors as such are not the cornerstones of these approaches. Even more importantly, all these approaches are primarily concerned with policy making; they are less concerned with community building, identity formation or polity making or they represent the functionalist line of argument in international relations that assumes that integration is a result of functional interdependencies and takes place through joint policy making in reaction to these interdependencies (Blatter 2009).³³ A similar emphasis on policies and functional interdependencies has characterised the early research on social movements. The notion of *framing* has also been very important in this field (e.g. Zald 2000, Oliver & Johnston 2000), but the emphasis shifted from analysing frames as competing devices for public policy-making to the role of frames for the mobilization and the internal coherence of social movements (Benford & Snow 2000). Furthermore, much more than in the formerly mentioned research fields, the literature on social movements recognised the important role of mass media (Walgrave & Manssens 2001).

Overall, cognitivist theorizing in political science has a strong policy orientation, which means that the theoretical approaches presuppose that cognitive (and normative) structures shape the perception of policy problems and the positions and preferences of actors in the process of public policy making. In the epistemic community approach the focus is on one community of actors that spans across international boundaries and gains a hegemonic position in shaping the problem perception in a policy field through its scientific authority; in the advocacy coalition approach, by contrast, the analysis focuses on two rivalling coalitions and puts more emphasis on the normative aspect in comparison to the epistemic community approach.³⁴ But it is the research on social movements that has developed analytical concepts and focal points, which correspond best to an elementarist world view within a functionally differentiated society by concentrating on the processes of mobilization and orientation within social movements.³⁵ The co-existence and the co-evolution of more or less competing social movements corresponds best to Luhmann's postulation that self-referential processes within subsystems should be seen as the core processes and the interferences between subsystems as secondary. In line with this, we will now turn to

³³ The only major cognitivist theorist in political science who focuses on the social construction of actors and their identities has been Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999). His approach corresponds to early symbolic interactionism, which represents a major predecessor of both, performative and cognitive action.

³⁴ Furthermore, as in Kingdon's agenda-setting approach, in the advocacy coalition framework there is space for actors who are not policy-oriented but primarily motivated by gaining a reputation for being a successful broker and innovator. These features take these analytic approaches more into the middle between functionally and segmentary images of social order.

³⁵ Nevertheless, it has been shown that the existence of competing frameworks and movements is very important for the internal mobilisation within social movements (e.g. Hewitt & McCommon 2004).

literature that sheds light on how communication shapes individual and collective opinions and (inter)actions without assuming that there exists an inherent trend towards shared understandings or consensus.

The functions and the functioning of priming and framing

The findings of cognitive psychology and communication science help us to gain a clearer understanding why and how (including how far) public discourses shape the attitudes and in consequence the actions of individuals and which rhetorical tools actors, in turn, apply in order to influence the public discourse. There has been a growing consensus that the mass media is not the only source of influence for individual opinion formation (Chong & Druckman 2007, Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007). It has a significant influence, though, conditionalized by individual predispositions, which leads communication scholars to talk about "the interactive construction of reality by mass media and audiences" (Scheufele 2000: 302).

We can differentiate two main communicative tools and their effects on collective and individual opinion formation and its quite telling for the "structurationist" thinking in this field of research that the same terminology is used for the tools and for the effects: priming and framing. This clearly points to the fact that actors try to influence the priorities and frames on the public agenda, but that these processes have emergent qualities and endogenous dynamics. *Priming* refers to the process by which an issue is receiving attention; *framing* refers to process by which a specific meaning is attached to an issue. On the macro-level, priming corresponds to collective agenda setting: the amount of time, space and weight which political actors (like governments or parties) or the media spend for an issue. In other words, priming tries to influence the *importance* assigned to an issue. Framing an issue in the public discourse, by contrast, means to influence the *interpretation* and *evaluation* of the issue by labelling and by linking it to specific contexts, values and standards. On the individual level, priming enhances the salience of an issue by guiding the current attention to it and by making it more accessible in the memory of the individual. Framing, in contrast, helps the individual to cope with the multidimensionality of issues by highlighting specific attributes or features. In a nutshell, the former influences *whether* we think about an issue whereas the latter shapes *how* we think about it (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007: 14).

Prospect Theory has revealed many other effects of framing; the most important might have been the insight that framing can be used to exploit the human inclination towards loss avoidance. In situations of uncertainty, people take greater risks to avoid losses than to obtain gains. In many experiments, it has been shown that exactly the same options can be formulated in terms of potential losses or in terms of potential gains. The risk propensity of the people differs significantly (Hallahan 1999: 214, McDermott 2004). In consequence, gloomy scenarios and projections can be used in campaigns in order to persuade the public that drastic changes are necessary. Since drastic changes in policies are risky because they unravel established norms, institutions and behaviour and might produce unintended

consequences, people are only willing to accept them if they believe that they are necessary to avoid disaster.

Another important insight comes from the literature that investigates the influence of elite discourses in the mass media on public opinion, measured on the individual level. It has been shown that the influence of dominant discourses is particularly strong among those people who are generally not very attentive to a field. For example, the mediated elite discourse on health care politics in the United States had an especially strong influence among those people who are not very interested in or aware of politics (Koch 1998). This means that public framing influences the attitudes and opinions of individuals, but it does not really motivate people to get engaged. Instead, they use frames as clues to make up their mind without much investment. This finding coincides with the more recent insights on the influence of emotions on cognitive processes. It has been theorised and proved empirically that the negative emotion of anxiety interrupts habitual routine, makes people more attentive to external stimuli and lays the groundwork for attitudinal change. But it is the feeling of positive emotions like enthusiasm that makes people actually become involved. This is why performances have to invoke positive emotions, but they work best in a context of fundamental uncertainty and change, which induces anxiety. In contrast, framing works best by stimulating negative emotions like anger, which trigger the disposition rather than the surveillance system. People become less open to new information; instead, they become more confident about their opinions and preferences, which in turn makes it more likely that they actually act in accordance with these cognitive dispositions (Druckman & McDermott 2008).

When we compare these insights to the ones we scrutinised in our description of the concepts of performance, we end up with the following differences. Emotional images and events try to make individual and collective actors aware of present and pressing transformations in their environment and they stimulate immediate and innovative reactions and collaboration. In other words, their core function is to influence the process of temporal prioritization and to provide some clues about current trends, which help the actors to become involved with other in innovative actions for mastering necessary transformations. In contrast, priming and framing try to influence the importance or weight that is given to an issue in comparison to other issues and the interpretation of the issue by linking it to specific basic values or human propensities (like loss avoidance). In respect to mobilization this means that priming and framing do not try to mobilise immediate and innovative reactions but to mobilise a lot of and risky actions.³⁶ In consequence, cognitive action is stimulated by and aims at the reduction of ambivalence and ambiguity. In contrast, performances depend on the fact that they can be interpreted in multiple ways.

Priming and framing are the core mechanisms that link public discourses as the communicative structures on the macro-level to individual attitudes and opinions as the cognitive features that shape

³⁶ Although immediate actions and risky actions are conceptually not the same, there is a strong overlap in actual practice. It is no accident that scholars who are investigating the relationships between framing and emotions are focusing on decision-making under risk and the specific kind of frames that play a role in those situations (Druckman & McDermott 2008).

individual (inter)actions in a mutually constitutive way. In contrast to public justifications and argumentations as the core mechanisms of the consensus-oriented concept of communicative action, it is not assumed that the actors try to reach a common understanding and an agreement across different functional camps in the society. Instead, priming and framing are self-referential mechanisms by which actors make sense for themselves and which actors employ to make sure that their perspectives prevail in the society. In order to set issues on the agenda and to influence their interpretation, discursive actors do not appeal to universal principles or generalizable interests, but to the specific values and predispositions of targeted audiences.

5.4 Summary

As shown, there are four different conceptualizations of strategic actors and the corresponding institutional devices that correspond to the instrumental presuppositions of the *homo oeconomicus*. These four conceptualizations differ in respect to which kind of actor is supposed to act strategically. The corresponding institutional devices have to make sure that the goals of these actors are set rationally, but primarily, they have to inhibit mechanisms for coordination and control, which ensure that the goals can be reached most effectively and efficiently. Table 4 sums up the major conceptual features of the four types of strategic actors and the corresponding mechanism of coordination and control.

Table 4:

Types of strategic actors and the corresponding institutional mechanisms for goal setting and control

		Forms of social differentiation	
		Segmentary differentiation	Functional differentiation
World view	Holism	Coherent Community Majority Vote and Hierarchical Order	Corporative units Constitutional Competences and Compulsory Bargaining
	Elementarism	Mobile Citizens Entry/Exit and/or Inclusion/Exclusion	Corporative units Congruence for Collective Goods; Choice of Exchange Partner

If we strive for institutional devices that allow coherent collectivities like nations or regionally concentrated cultural communities to derive a collective will in an effective and efficient way, formal devices for decision-making like voting are paramount and the majority rule should prevail. Institutions that inhibit the possibility to rule by hierarchical order are the most effective and efficient devices for implementing the collective will.

By contrast, if we start with free and mobile citizens as the main strategic actors, the main device for effectively forming a collective will and for efficiently steering public agents is to secure a plurality of political-administrative units and allowing citizens to signal their preferences and satisfaction through exit and entry. The more free movement of citizens between these units is restricted by exclusionary

devices, the more the locus of strategic agency moves away from mobile and individual citizens towards particular communities and their sedentary members.

If we start from functionalist presuppositions we focus on corporative actors or formal organizations, which are supposed to have a capacity for goal setting and strategic action. Within a holistic approach the goals, tasks and competences of the diverse organizations are deduced from an overarching constitutional framework. This formal framework, which is set up in a deliberative process of constitution making, specifies not only the competences and responsibilities of each corporate unit but also the interdependencies and the necessary interplay between these organizations. The more the regulatory framework emphasises the need for coordination and cooperation and demands compulsory bargaining among the corporate units, the more holistic the system is. If the organizational entities have minimal overlapping competences and the rules do not demand cooperation, the system becomes more elementaristic.

Nevertheless, a consequential elementaristic approach starts not with the competences formally spelled out in a constitution, but with the functional imperative to reach congruence between those who profit from a collective good or service and those who pay for it. This can best be reached by specialised organizations that produce and/or provide specific collective goods and services to its members and that trade intermediate goods among each other. The institutional rules have to ensure that the market is open for new organizations willing to supply collective goods and services and that the corporate actors can choose between different exchange partners.

As we have seen, we can also distinguish four conceptualizations of social interaction and the corresponding understandings of institutions that are compatible with the view of human nature based on the *homo sociologicus*. In this case, we do not start with different kinds of actors but with different theories of social (inter)action and communication and describe the corresponding kinds of institutionalised structures, which are created by social interactions and communication and which at the same time shape these processes (see table 5).

Table 5:

Forms of social (inter)action and corresponding institutional mechanisms for orientation and mobilization

		Forms of social differentiation	
		Segmentary differentiation	Functional differentiation
World view	Holism	Normative Action Culture/Roles	Communicative Action Principles/Consensus
	Elementarism	Performative Action Images/Events	Cognitive Action Discourses/Frames

The concept of normative action provides a micro-foundation for the processes of social interaction and integration in segmented societies. A common culture, understood as an established and comprehensive system of values and role-specific norms and expectations, is maintained and re-enacted by rituals, myths and symbols. Social norms shape individual behaviour primarily when they are internalised during processes of socialization and secondarily through the social control of the community and reference groups.

The notion of performance or performative action, in contrast, locates social interaction not as embedded in an established and comprehensive culture but in a socio-cultural environment that is characterised by flux and transformation. Social interaction is aiming to cope with such an environment by presenting an attractive and innovative image of the self to the audience in order to gain attention and recognition. Social integration or at least some form of loose coupling is reached because social actors mutually observe their performances and impressive images and events provide some kind of joint orientation.

The two other conceptualizations focus on communication instead of interaction since they are based on the image of a functionally differentiated society. The concept of communicative action assumes the possibility of coherent social interactions and a rather strong form of social integration. The basis for this is not an established culture anymore, but striving for consensus, which can be reached through mutual justification and public argumentation. The underlying basis for communicative action is a common language and a joint life world and the agreements that are reached through communicative action can be institutionalised through constitutions, conventions and covenants, which in turn serve to facilitate further consensus formation in specific policy fields.

The notion of cognitive action, in contrast, no longer emphasises the bonds across divergent social subsystems of society that are created by a shared language and the obligations of mutual justification, but the connections between the communicative structures on the macro- or meso-level of society and the cognitive processes on the micro-level. Public discourses and individual predispositions interact and shape public and individual opinions and attitudes, which in turn influence the individual (inter)actions and choices. The core mechanisms within these processes are priming and framing, which influence whether an issue receives attention and how it is interpreted. Usually, there are multiple discourses and frames, which more or less directly compete with each other for attention and for shaping collective and individual attitudes and actions. As is the case with performances, a social system that is structured by strongly self-referential discourses and frames is only loosely coupled, because external stimuli are only taken up in accordance with internal predispositions and the corresponding communicative and cognitive schemas.

6 The relationship between polity and society as crucial for differentiating forms of governance

After having elaborated on the fundamental theoretical building blocks for a thorough understanding of political steering and integration in the previous chapters, I will now link them with the findings from the first chapter, before presenting eight ideal-type forms of political *governance* in the subsequent chapter. Thus, I will now once again explicitly clarify how I understand and use some fundamental terms in the following parts of the book.

6.1 Government versus Governance: Instrumental or constitutive relationship between polity and society

It was demonstrated in chapter 5.1 that the core feature of the *homo oeconomicus* is the fact that he exhibits an instrumental relationship to others and to institutions, while the *homo sociologicus* is characterised by having a constitutive relationship. To put it differently: For the *homo oeconomicus*, social scientists assume a high degree of differentiation between actors and between actors and institutions, whereas the *homo sociologicus* is perceived as having less autonomy in respect to other actors and institutions. The *homo oeconomicus* acquires his goals exogenously, which means that these goals are hardly influenced by social inter-/transactions and institutions. Institutions are instruments for coordinating actions, but do not strongly influence the formation of goals themselves. For these instruments of social coordination to be truly taken into consideration by individuals, they must be furnished with clear and formal rules and external rewarding and sanctioning mechanisms. The related formal organizations exist independently of whether their goals and rules coincide with the values and norms of the individual actors. As for the *homo sociologicus* by contrast, interactions, communication and institutions decisively influence the development of the goals and perceptions of individual actors. Institutions work primarily through the internalization of corresponding norms or through emotion- or cognition-based identification of relevant contexts.

If we now transfer these considerations from the micro-level of individual behaviour to the meso-level of the social sub-systems, it is evident that the view of human nature based on the *homo oeconomicus* corresponds with an understanding of the relationship between society and polity that sees the political-administrative system as an instrument that the social system has set up for facilitating its transactions. As illustrated in chapter 1.1 this corresponds with the instrumental understanding of politics, as is predominant in judicial as well as economic theories of the state. The state (or the politico-administrative system) serves as an instrument or agent for implementing goals and interests, which are formed in the society (or the socio-economic system). Formal aggregation and voting rules indeed contribute to reaching binding political decisions, but they do not influence the actual formation of goals and interests in society. Therefore, the political system requires formal organizations, highly

institutionalised legal rules and material resources to implement the binding decisions in the society. The strong differentiation between society and polity and the separation and autonomization of political and administrative organizations have the effect that these theories of governance place emphasis on issues of societal control over the state on the one hand, and state control over society, on the other.

The view of human nature based on the *homo sociologicus*, by contrast, corresponds with theories built on the assumption of a constitutive relationship between society and polity. The assumption of a strong penetration of state and society means that politics is attributed a more significant role in defining social identities, goals and interests and that the society in turn takes on a large share of the task of implementing political decisions. The lesser degree of differentiation between politics and society has the consequence that the focus of theoretical analysis is no longer placed so much on mutual control, rather on issues concerning the coherence and integration of socio-political units.

As presented in chapter 1.1, the latter – constitutive – perspective in the normative debate on the reform of the state is linked with the term *governance*, while the instrumental conceptualization of the relationship between society and polity can be associated with the terms *government* and *management*. To create theoretically substantiated ideal-types of socio-political steering and integration it appears expedient to express the dualism between the instrumental and constitutive perspective in the terms *government* and *governance* and to complement these two basic terms with more precise adjectives when devising more specific ideal-types. However, the term *governance* is still used in a second way, namely as a generic umbrella term for all – instrumental and constitutive – forms of socio-political steering and integration. This double usage of the term *governance* reflects the fact that it has been introduced in normative contexts as an alternative to government as an expression for the dominant forms of political steering in the 20th century, but in analytical contexts as an expanded understanding of governing, which comprises both “old” and “new” forms of steering and integration.

6.2 Integration instead of constitution and loose coupling

With reference to social theory, I introduced the term “constitutive” when describing the sociological understanding of the relationship between actors and institutions and between society and polity. This puts into question whether it is adequate to use the term “integration” in my general definition of *governance* as “institutional forms of political steering and integration” in order to denote those structures and processes which are based on the *homo sociologicus*. The reason for the further use of the term “integration” instead of “constitution” or “constitutionalizing” lies above all in its better compatibility with the corresponding practical and applied social science discourses, in which the term “integration” is widely used in the appropriate sense (see Chap. 1.1.2). The term “constitution”, by contrast, has strong legal connotations in practical parlance and its use for denoting the sociological approach to social interactions and institutions would be quite misleading, since one of the core differences to instrumental

or economic conceptualizations is the fact that institutions are seen as rather informal and not based on a strong legal foundation.

However, the elaborations on the various worldviews have revealed another problem for the term “integration.” I have made clear that only those theories that are based on a holistic worldview actually assume that the society is integrated in the strong sense of the word; theoretical approaches based on an elementaristic worldview, in contrast, do not presume that societal integration is a functional need or a primer goal for social actors or parts of the society. Instead, they presume that the various parts or subsystems of society are striving for autonomy. “Integration” takes place only as a side effect of attempts to secure the autonomy of the parts. We took the term “loose coupling” from system theory to describe the corresponding assumption on how the society is held together. Nevertheless, also in this respect, the further use of the term “integration” as the generic term for all kinds of institutional mechanisms that are supposed to connect the various elements of the society can be justified with its better compatibility to colloquial use.

7 Forms of political governance: ideal-types and their characteristics

Based on the three fundamental dimensions – world views, images of social order and models of human nature – and the understanding of political governance as institutionalised forms of political steering and integration defined in the previous chapter, I will now scrutinise eight ideal-types of political *governance*. The following typology of eight forms of *governance* includes all combinations that are logically possible given the three dimensions and two idealized expressions in each dimension (see Table 6).

Table 6: Ideal-typical forms of political governing

<i>Instrumental forms of governing</i>		
	Segmentary differentiation	Functional differentiation
Holistic	Centralised Government Aggregating Votes and Hierarchical Directions	Concerted Governments Assigning Competences and Compulsory Bargaining
Elementaristic	Competing Governments Allowing Mobility and Mutual Adjustment	Contracting Governments Aligning Supply to Demand for Collective Goods
<i>Constitutive forms of governing</i>		
Holistic	Communitarian Governance Representing Commonalities through Cultural Symbols and Rituals	Civic Governance Reaching Consensus/Acceptance through Justification and Principled Argumentation
Elementaristic	Creative Governance Stimulating Innovation through Attractive Images and Emotional Events	Cogent Governance Shaping Agendas and Attitudes through Priming and Framing

These descriptions “operationalise” the ideal-types so that they can be applied in empirical work like in the habilitation (Blatter 2007), where we trace the historical development and transformations of governance paradigms and realities in the United States from 1850 to 2000.

7.1 Centralised Government

The first ideal-type of a form of *governance* is based on a combination of a holistic worldview, a segmentary view of social order and an instrumental understanding of the relationship between the polity and the society. The corresponding form of governing is set up in order to identify and enforce the common will of a culturally coherent political community upon its territory. This implies a strong and integrated government, which is connected to the society through a central institution (parliament) with comprehensive competences and majority rule as decision-making device. The majority will is transformed into law, which forms the basis for implementing the will of the people through hierarchical directions with the help of a centralised and professionalized bureaucracy.

The definition of the common will and collective goals takes place through the aggregation of individual preferences via the election of parties and people, who integrate diverse issues into an ideologically coherent program. The development of a strong collective identity among the members of the community allows for the use of majority rule as the mode of decision-making. Collective goals are primarily implemented by means of regulatory instruments and hierarchical institutions on the basis of Weber’s bureaucratic model. The ideal-type of *centralised government* assumes that the government has full control over society, which implies not only the territorial congruence between its regulatory reach and the space of intensive socio-economic interaction, but also that it has the competences for regulation in all policy fields. This enables the government – taking into account the majority will of the population – to set priorities and (re)distribute resources both across territorial parts of the society as well as across policies and socio-economic classes.

7.2 Concerted Governments

The ideal-type of *concerted governments* also contains an instrumental understanding of political institutions and is based on a holistic worldview. In contrast to *centralised government* though, it is adapted to a functionally differentiated society. Since there is no culturally coherent community, majority vote is not an acceptable way for goal setting anymore. Instead, a constitutional framework provides the principles for the assignment of tasks and responsibilities to a multiplicity of specialised organs and organization within the politico-administrative system. Overlapping competences and procedural prescriptions for mutual consultation, coordination and cooperation lead to a system of institutional *checks and balances*. Common goals are set through a process of compulsory bargaining and they are

implemented by the specialised and internally hierarchical organizations, which participated in the negotiations that lead to the agreement.

In such a system of governance, political control – both as political steering of socio-economic processes and as societal control over politics – is achieved through a combination of institutional division *and* overlaps. Not ideologically oriented parties – as in the centralised government system – but functional interest organizations are the main intermediary organisations that bundle societal interests in the will formation process. The state reinforces this organizational bundling of interests by recognizing peak organizations as bargaining partners and by the transfer of self-steering authority. Altogether, the term “concerted”, which stems from the study of corporatism (Lehmbruch 1982, Streek and Schmitter 1985), appears to be best suited to express the basic philosophy of this form of *governance*, in which functional specialization and a guided interplay of specialised organizational actors are the core principles.

The ideal-type mode of transaction within a system of *concerted governments* is *compulsory bargaining* among a limited number of organizational actors. The negotiations are characterised by the fact that all involved actors have a veto position and that an agreement can only be reached by consensus. Furthermore, it is assumed that the organizational actors have fixed interests, which are susceptible to endogenous redefinition through the communication process. The egocentric interaction orientation of the involved corporative actors makes agreements only possible when the solution fulfils the Pareto criterion. Furthermore, the solution is characterised by a compromise that represents the bargaining power of the involved organizations. The fact that many negotiations in such a system involve the same actors, who face each other over and over again, makes it possible to use package deals, side-payments and other means to facilitate compromises and agreements (Scharpf 1992).

7.3 Competing Governments

The ideal-type of *competing governments* combines an instrumental understanding of institutions with a segmentary image of society and an elementaristic worldview. The decisive conceptual difference to the ideal-type of *centralised government* consists in the fact that an integrated political community is no longer presupposed as a foundation for defining the collective interests that government is supposed to implement. However, this ideal-type does not question the homogeneity of the political community (as is the case with the *concerted governments* approach), rather its stability and continuity in terms of defining who belongs and who does not. The *competing governments* approach does not presume anymore the *a priori* and long-term embeddedness of the individual in a political community. Instead, it assumes that individuals are mobile and can select and change their membership in socio-political communities through territorial (re)location. Membership is based on residence and involves the

entitlement of broad bundle of public services provided by the local government in exchange to paying general taxes.

These exchanges between residents (taxes) and local governments (collective goods and services) represent the “normal” transactions within this system of governance, but there is another form of “transaction”, which is crucial for the functioning of the system. It is the (potential) *entry* to and *exit from* self-governing communities, that individuals can undertake, and the corresponding reactions of the governments, which represent the core mechanisms for collective goal setting and for controlling the governments. The structural prerequisite for making the freedom to move an act of political choice is the existence of a multiplicity of self-organizing communities. A plurality of formally independent socio-political communities allows for the development of different policies and public services, and grants individuals the possibility to join together with those people who have similar preferences. Furthermore, the *exit*-option of individuals and the competition among the self-organizing communities for tax-paying residents forces the governments of these communities to be sensitive to the wishes of mobile individuals and to provide their services in an efficient way.

The concept of *competing governments* is based on the image of segmentary differentiated society and not on functional differentiation. The local communities are territorially defined, demarcated by political-administrative boundaries, provide a wide range of public services and are responsible for fundamental regulations (e.g. land use planning and public safety). The individual entry into or the exit from a local community is about the choice of residence. For this kind of decision, the individual takes into account not only a multiplicity of related costs and benefits, very often it involves huge investments in financial but also in social capital. This means that it is not appropriate to describe the form of transactions that goes along with exit and entry as “shopping” (e.g. Tiebout 1956: 422, Oates 1981: 93); and the actors are mischaracterised when described as “consumers”– instead, it is much more appropriate to perceive them as “investors” who invest a large part of their primary goods in a local community in exchange for the private and public goods offered in that location (Fischel 2001).

7.4 Contracting Governments

Combining an elementaristic ontology and an instrumental notion of institutions with functional differentiation leads to the ideal-type of *contracting governments*. Such a system of governance is not characterised anymore by a multiplicity of territorial units of government which offer quite comprehensive bundles of services and regulations but by a multiplicity of single purpose governments, which focus on the production and/or provision of specific public goods.

Specialization involves, on the one hand, the concentration on specific goods (such as transportation infrastructure, water supply, education or police) and, on the other hand, the distinction between producers of a public service and the providers of the public service. Such a functionally differentiated

system creates two kinds of markets, whereby the second one is the more important. The first market is working if individuals can choose among different service providers and the service providers compete for individual consumers. In this case, characterizing the individual actor as “consumer” is more adequate than in the *competing governments* approach, because the choice involves only one specific service or good at a time and his/her investment that goes along with the choice is rather limited. Nevertheless, these markets seldom work, because of the specific characteristics of collective goods. Usually it is not possible to exclude individual consumers (e.g. from public security) and usually, public goods are characterised by having strong network effects and large fix costs (think about water or sewage infrastructure). Finally, there is a large part of public services – including most regulatory tasks like land use planning – which cannot be provided by markets. In consequence, it is the second market, which really drives this form of governance. It is the market that emerges between service producers (agencies and corporations which actually produce services like public transport or plans) and service providers (governments that make sure that their members receive the services). Service producers and providers are both corporative actors and the transactions between them are characterised by negotiations that lead to contracts in which the details of their exchanges are formally laid out.

The coupling of such diverse specialised and differentiated entities no longer takes place through a hierarchical organization (bureaucracy), as is the case with the model of *centralised government*, or by means of a system of compulsory bargaining, as is the case with the concept of *concerted governments*, rather by means of voluntary agreements and contracts between corporative units, which are formally independent of one another. Contrary to the concept of *competitive governments*, the elementarism of this approach is thus not based on many individuals and multiple municipalities, rather on a diversity of functionally specialised organizations, whereby the system is only working properly if there are multiple organizations for each function so that their exchange partners actually have a choice. The institutional framework for this kind of governance has primarily to make sure that a plurality of service producers and providers exists, so that the market properly works.

From instrumental to constitutive forms of governing

The forms of *governance* illustrated up to now are associated with a model of human nature based on the *homo oeconomicus*, which leads to an instrumental understanding of the relationship between actors and institutions. By contrast, the following forms of *governance* are in line with the constitutive understanding that corresponds to the *homo sociologicus*. In consequence, in the following ideal-type forms of governance, we will no longer see the strong “objectivication” of the institutions of *governance* that goes along with formal organizations and there is a much weaker structural differentiation between the politico-administrative system and the socio-economic system. The previously outlined forms of political *governance* predominated rely on formal and legal instruments such as laws, regulations, binding plans and contracts. The following forms of *governance*, by contrast, are characterised by the use

of communicative instruments like symbols, principled arguments, images and scenarios. Beyond these common features though, there are distinct differences among the following ideal-types of *governance* with regard to how and to what ends social interaction and communication is facilitated and influenced.

7.5 Communitarian governance

The first ideal-type within the field of constitutive forms of *governance* is labelled *communitarian governance*. This form of governance resembles a holistic worldview and a segmentary view of social order. The ideal-type thus builds on the concept of community (Tönnies) and that of mechanical solidarity (Durkheim). It presumes a common identity of the members and the integration of society by an overarching culture (Parsons). While the term community in these classic works is primarily associated with the notion of a pre-modern, traditional form of society, the term *communitarian governance* alludes to the more recent communitarian movement (for an overview see Delanty 2003). It stresses that community plays a large role even in the modern era as a source of individual identity and belonging and is indispensable for upholding morality and solidarity. In consequence, the preservation or forging of a community is an essential goal of political governance.

The micro-foundation of this ideal-type is thus normative action in the classic formulation of the *homo sociologicus*. Institutional mechanisms, which try to stimulate this kind of action, are symbols that highlight the shared history and the common fate of a community. Furthermore, public rituals are held in order to instil a sense of shared belonging into the membership.

This concept of *governance* presumes that individual and collective identities are based on an awareness of commonalities (and not of differences). Stable identities in turn create a sense of belonging, which is the basis for solidarity and loyalty. In contrast to the instrumental concept of *centralised government*, it is not presumed that a common culture exists or that it is strong enough for shaping the identities and actions of the members of a community, but such a common culture is seen as necessary for a functioning social and political system. In consequence, it is the task of governing to preserve, (re)create and vitalize a common culture. In order to do so collective identities and shared values must be "re-presented" in public appearances, so that the members of a community are aware of them, take them into account in their decisions and feel obliged to act in a solidaristic way. Within the *centralised government* concept, an existing common culture legitimizes formal decision-making based on majority rule. Furthermore, the ideal-typical intermediary actor in the process of collective will-formation is the class- or ideology-based party. Within the *communitarian governance* concept, in contrast, it is the core task of governing to (re)produce a common culture. This might be seen as a first step towards introducing majority voting, but it might also work in itself insofar as an awareness of commonalities might induce mutual action without formal decision-making. The ideal-typical intermediary actor in the process of collective will-formation is a nationalist or regionalist party.

7.6 Civic Governance

Civic governance is a constitutive approach to governing that combines a holistic worldview with a functionally differentiated image of social order. In contrast to the *communitarian governance* model, the *civic governance* model no longer assumes that it is possible to refer to strong commonalities among the members of a segmentally demarcated community (common culture or tradition) as the basis for social interaction and social integration. A functionally differentiated society is characterised, in contrast, by strong pluralism in respect to values, interests and perspectives. In contrast to the *concerted governments* approach, the *civic governance* approach focuses not so much on organized interest groups and the various governmental branches and departments as expressions of this societal pluralism. Instead, it emphasises the plurality of groups within the civil society and the different perspectives within the public discourse. A common language and life world provide the basis for communicative action characterised by mutual justification and the exchange of principled arguments, which in turn make it possible to reach agreements and consensus. This represents the holistic core of this approach.

The holistic orientation of this approach is also demonstrated by the fact that the communicative understanding among the involved actors is always supposed to result in collective decision for the entire society. The collective decision, though, is neither reached by majority voting or compulsory bargaining nor by appeals to strong commonalities, rather through a deliberative process of justification and argumentation in which a consensus is forged through the "forceless power of the better argument." The ideal-type intermediary actors in the process of collective will-formation are the various interest groups and social movements that comprise a civil society. They also play a role in the implementation of the agreement. Nevertheless, since all affected interests and all relevant perspectives have to be taken into account in the public deliberation, other actors - including governmental actors - are also included.

7.7 Creative Governance

Like *communitarian governance*, *creative governance* is an ideal-type that presumes a segmentally differentiated society populated by a plurality of territorially defined socio-political communities. The core task for *creative governance* is to establish a new collective identity. The elementaristic worldview implies a clearly different understanding of collective identities in comparison to the one that underlies *communitarian governance*. Not commonalities and stability are seen as crucial features of collective identities. Instead, difference and change are characteristic for the process of identity formation in a world that is pluralistic and in transformation. Furthermore, identities are no longer anchored in internalized norms or an established culture, rather result from the attempts to present an attractive image of oneself to an audience and to distinguish oneself from others.

Thus, *creative governance* is based on performative action as a behavioural micro-foundation. Institutions and mechanisms of *creative governance* are supposed to enable the members of the political

and social community to bring about change and motivate them to innovate. Furthermore, they should attract further attractive and creative members. To do so, they must strengthen the profile of a community through emotional events as well as attractive images and projects. In other words, "branding" is the core mechanism of this kind of governance. On the one hand, branding tries to increase the feeling of self-confidence and self-efficacy of the members of a community, which in turn facilitates innovation and risk-taking. On the other hand, communities with an attractive image gain the attention of external actors and might be able to attract new members. The institutional means and mechanisms are strongly "structurationist". This is because they are at the same time the result of transformational actions and the core means to stimulate innovation. Furthermore, agents have leeway to decide how exactly they want to present and profile themselves, but at the same time they are forced to observe closely the present contexts in order to capture ongoing socio-economic and cultural trends.

A final characteristic of creative governance that distinguishes this approach from *communitarian*, *communicative*, as well as from *cogent governance*, is the fact that performative actions can and should be ambiguous in respect to goals, values and norms. Instead, they focus on form and aesthetics. They must attract attention from different kinds of actors with different values and goals. Furthermore, they are supposed to facilitate the cooperation between different kinds of actors, so that technical, social and political innovations in the sense of Schumpeter's "new combinations" become possible. *Creative governance* focuses on "interface management" between actors from various sectors (public, private and non-profit sectors), in order to facilitate synergetic and situated cooperation. In contrast to the *civic governance* approach, the joint activities or projects are not the result of consensus building through reflection, justification and argumentation and they are not set up in order to channel the development of a socio-political community in a certain direction through specific policy programs. Instead, they try to signal to internal and external actors that "something" is changing and that this change is "innovative", so that it is attractive for them to participate.

7.8 Cogent Governance

The last ideal-type, *cogent governance* is distinct from *creative governance* in so far that it presumes that the functional differentiation of society is crucial for its understanding and steering and not the segmental differentiation. In consequence, the focus is not on the (trans)formation of identities and on polity (re)making, but on the communicative construction of problems, perspectives, preferences and on policy making. Contrary to the concept of *contracting governments*, functional differentiation is not translated into organizational division of labour in the production of public goods; rather it is identified as a characteristic of the public sphere of a pluralistic society where a multiplicity of partly competing and partly co-evolving discourses are shaping individual and collective attitudes and opinions, which in turn influence individual and collective actions and choices.

Contrary to the *civic governance* concept this approach does not assume that public communication can or is supposed to overcome the different perspectives that exist on an issue and that actors are agreement- or consensus-oriented. Instead, emergent processes of priming and framing characterise public discourses. Individual behaviour and collective action is not characterised by consensus-oriented communicative action but by self-referential cognitive action in which individual predispositions on the micro-level and publicized perspectives on the macro-level reinforce each other. As it is the case with the *creative governance* approach, cogent governance is based on a strongly "structurationist" conceptualization of the core mechanisms which at the same time form the institutional context that shapes individual action and are influenced and reconstructed by individual actions. All kinds of actors – governments, parties, interests groups and NGOs – as well as the media itself use priming and framing techniques to influence the importance and the interpretations of public issues, but their activities are strongly shaped by predispositions and public discourses. In contrast to the performances and branding activities within the *creative governance* approach, priming and framing activities are strongly connected to specific goals and values (e.g. equality in contrast to freedom). *Cogent governance* aims to influence individual and public opinion by highlighting specific values and by attempting to connect specific decisions to specific values. Finally, in contrast to *creative governance*, *cogent governance* is not necessarily transformative and geared towards innovation. On the contrary, framing is often most successful, if it taps into existing predispositions and values. Advocates of change have to introduce threatening scenarios and projections in order to change public opinion and to lay the groundwork for new and risky policies.

8 Conclusion

These eight forms of *governance* developed here serve as ideal-types, which build on fundamental social science concepts and loosely couple these concepts in a differentiated typology. All these ideal-types are based on a behavioural micro-foundation and the corresponding conceptualization of institutionalised structures on a meso- or macro-level. In consequence, each ideal-type inhibits certain social and causal mechanisms, which means that they are highly useful for causal analysis and for normative-programmatic applications. Due to their broad foundations, the ideal-types can also be used for the descriptive-comparative analysis of *governance* concepts and actual forms of *governance* over longer periods of time and across different cultures. Thus they appear to be particularly suitable for making the current transformation more understandable in the light of more long-term developments. The empirical section of the present book will demonstrate the capacity of these ideal-types to do so.

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